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Evolutionary and economic theories of fertility variation argue that novel subsistence 
opportunities associated with market economies shape reproduction in ways that both 
increase parental investment per child and lower overall fertility. I use demographic and 
ethnographic data from Guatemala as a case study to illustrate how ethnic inequalities in 
accessing market opportunities have shaped demographic variation and the perceptions of 
parental investments. I then discuss two projects that use secondary data sets to address 
issues of conceptualizing and operationalizing market opportunities in national and cross-
population comparative work.  The first argues that social relationships are critical means of 
accessing market opportunities, and uses Guatemala household stocks of certain forms of 
relational wealth are associated with greater parental investments in education. The second 
focuses on a methodological issue in how common measures of wealth in comparative 
demographic studies conflate economic capacity with market opportunities, and how this 
conceptual confusion biases our interpretations of the observed links between wealth and 
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The recent transition from high mortality and high fertility to low mortality and low 
fertility is a defining feature of contemporary humans.  Low fertility is a central puzzle in 
evolutionary approaches human behavior because of the problem of reconciling a reduction 
in fertility with a framework centered on maximizing reproductive success (Mulder 1998; 
Vining 1986). A simple prediction from evolutionary life-history theory would posit that 
increasing access to resources and material security that accompanies economic development 
should be converted into greater reproductive output.  However, a key feature of modern 
low fertility is the negative association between socioeconomic status and fertility 
(Goodman, et al. 2012; Mulder 1998). 
A complete evolutionary account of low fertility among industrial populations must be 
consistent with reproductive patterns observed in traditional societies (Hill and Hurtado 
1996; Kaplan, et al. 2002; Winterhalder and Smith 2000). Early evolutionary theorists 
proposed cultural success should increase the likelihood of reproductive success (Alexander 
1979; Irons 1979), with the ethnographic literature rife with examples of wealth, status, and 
prestige improving reproductive outcomes in traditional societies (Betzig and Turke 1986; 
Cronk 1991; Mealey 1985; Mulder 1987).  
Modelled as a quality-quantity trade-off, the negative association is the result of 
changing patterns of parental investments in response to new social and economic 
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opportunities (Becker 1992; Kaplan 1996; Mace 2014). This shift has altered the costs and 
benefits of extended parental investment and the availability of helpers to subsidize the costs 
of childbearing (Hrdy 2009; Turke 1989). The importance of education for economic and 
social achievements in these new environments has increased the cost of rearing successful 
children. While models suggest low fertility can maximize fitness under specific conditions 
(Hill and Reeve 2005; Low, et al. 2002), empirically the benefits of recent low fertility do not 
appear to translate to increased fitness even after several generations (Goodman, et al. 2012). 
Models that focus on the role of parental investments in education in rearing successful 
children are perhaps the most prominent and accepted frameworks in the evolutionary social 
sciences.  Empirically, limiting fertility has been shown to increase both offspring 
educational attainment and adult income in a number of contexts (Goodman, Koupil, & 
Lawson, 2012; Kaplan, Lancaster, Johnson, & Bock, 1995). The proposed link between these 
two outcomes is that educational attainment is the primary means by which parents increase 
the quality of their offspring, and the primary means by which offspring access high-income 
employment.  The models based on this quality quantity trade-off dynamic have proposed 
that parents have a psychology which attempts to maximize the summed income (i.e. 
resources) across all offspring (Snopkowski & Kaplan, 2014).  
Recently, these economic models that focus on maximizing income across offspring 
have been criticized for a narrow focus on a single proposed life history trade-off (D. W. 
Lawson & Mulder, 2016a; Shenk, Hooper, & Kaplan, 2016). Indeed recent analysis have 
suggested that the quality-quantity trade-off does not account for variation in fertility in pre-
transition populations and that the trade-off observed in modern economies reflects a much 
more fundamental shift in reproductive decision making that previously thought (D. W. 
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Lawson & Mulder, 2016b).  Reproductive decisions are made in concert with other life 
history trade-offs, particularly those trade-offs parents make between investment in 
reproduction vs. investments in themselves.  Just as investments in child quality trade-off 
with fertility in modern market economies, investments in parental status may also trade-off 
with fertility.   
Status competition plays an important role in human reproduction (Boone & Kessler, 
1999; Turke & Betzig, 1985).  Status hierarchies are pervasive across human societies, 
including the relatively egalitarian hunting and gathering groups.  Furthermore, status 
differentials show a broadly positive association with reproductive success across 
nonindustrial populations (von Rueden, 2014).  The reproductive returns to status in 
foraging and horticultural groups can include access to mating opportunities, cooperative 
sharing and coalition partners, and the ability to marshal greater aid when sick or injured 
(reviewed in (von Rueden, 2014)). These returns can lead to greater overall fertility, or 
increased offspring survival. These broadly positive associations suggest a universal concern 
for status may be a basic human motivation subject to positive selection in our evolutionary 
history. (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013; Shenk et al., 2016; von 
Rueden, 2014). 
Status competition has played a key part in evolutionary theorizing about causes of low 
fertility.  Similar to wealth, Irons argued that cultural success, or relative social status, is 
translated into reproductive success in traditional societies(Irons, 1983; Vining, 1986).  That 
is, we have evolved to pursue status because in the ancestral past status was fitness 
enhancing.  However, in modern market economies, the links between status and 
reproductive success have been severed (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998c; Pérusse, 1993), and we 
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are stuck with the evolved mechanisms that motivate status competition.  More recently, 
evolutionary demographers have emphasized the role of status competition in shaping 
fertility patterns.  Low modelled the conditions under which status competition could result 
in lower fertility could result in longer term reproductive success (Low, Simon, & Anderson, 
2002). Furthermore, population studies in industrial societies have found that the association 
between wealth and reproductive outcomes can vary across socioeconomic status and 
subgroups within populations (R. L. Hopcroft, 2006; Mace, 1998; Stulp, Sear, Schaffnit, 
Mills, & Barrett, 2016a).  Finally, Shenk et al argue that the robust effects of status in small 
scale societies and the potential for status to trade-off with fertility in conditions of heritable 
wealth and market economies means that purely economic models of fertility decline are 
incomplete.   
“We argue that economic and risk-based models are necessary yet insufficient to 
explain modern levels of fertility decline and suggest that failure to consider stats 
competition is a key reason why (Shenk et al., 2016, pg 2)”. 
This dissertation aims to extend this work by outlining the various proposed 
mechanisms linking parental investments in education to greater offspring socioeconomic 
success.  The dissertation proposes that education is not the sole determinant of offspring 
socioeconomic success.  Rather the effects of education on socioeconomic success are 
shaped by the channels, or the suite of market opportunities, that individuals and households 
have to turn education into income in their socio-economic contexts.  It explores how access 
(or lack of access) to these market opportunities shape parental decisions about educating 
their children and about how many children to have.  It examines this at a range of scales, 
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including in-depth study of these dynamics in rural and urban Guatemala as well as broad 
comparative analysis of fertility across 56 low- and middle-income countries worldwide. 
This work extends economic models of fertility by adding one form of status 
differentials in the calculus.  Anthropologists have recently clarified the distinction between 
wealth and status, where wealth broadly represents resources, while status broadly represents 
access or opportunities to access resources (Borgerhoff Mulder & Beheim, 2011; Colleran, 
Jasienska, Nenko, Galbarczyk, & Mace, 2015).  The focus on market opportunities captures 
the idea that the income returns to parental investments in education depend in part on the 
status of the household, proxied by opportunities available to turn education into income.   
Chapter 1 presents a descriptive account of ethnic differences in fertility and parental 
investments in Guatemala.  The fertility decline in Guatemala is characterized by large ethnic 
differences in the rate of the decline over the last 50 years, with the large indigenous Mayan 
population showing higher fertility and slower declines than the non-indigenous Ladino 
population.  Most of the literature on these ethnic differences in fertility in Guatemala has 
focused on access and uptake of family planning, with little explicit focus on the social and 
structural barriers Mayans face in accessing market opportunities (Metz, 2001; Santiso-
Gálvez, Ward, & Bertrand, 2015; Seiber & Bertrand, 2002).  This chapter focuses on how 
social and economic exclusion face by Mayans has limited the economic benefits of reduced 
fertility and increased investments in education. This descriptive account outlines how 
variation in accessing novel economic opportunities associated with economic development 
has shaped ethnicity-related differences in parents’ reproductive decisions.   
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Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 address issues of conceptualizing and operationalizing 
market opportunities in empirical research on parental investment and fertility behaviors in 
national and cross-national research.  Chapter 2 builds upon the descriptive account outlined 
in Chapter 1 to test predictions about the effects of market opportunities on parental 
investment decisions.  The study focuses on one pathway by which Mayan households can 
increase access to market opportunities – social networks.  A large body of work over the 
last 30 years has emphasized the importance of social capital in today’s modern world 
(Bourdieu 1986; Knack and Keefer 1997; Lin 2002; Torsvik 2000), particularly as a 
determinant of economic outcomes for both individuals (Coleman 1988) and households 
(Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Narayan and Pritchett 2000). The resources embedded in social 
networks shapes access and effectiveness of investments in education (Horvat, et al. 2003; 
Lai, et al. 2015), and economic outcomes in competitive wage labor economies (Burt 2000; 
Granovetter 1973; Marsden and Hurlbert 1988).  Drawing on this body of research, this 
study tests the prediction that Mayan households with key forms of social capital will be 
more willing to invest in offspring education as they have the social capital to leverage that 
education into higher paying jobs in the future.  Using nationally representative data from 
over 11,000 school-aged children, the study finds that 1) household stocks of social capital 
do positively associate with parental investments in offspring education, and 2) the effects of 
social capital are significantly stronger for Mayan households.  Importantly, all else equal, 
ethnic disparities in school-enrollment of indigenous girls disappears when indigenous 
households have the right types of social connections.   
Chapter 3 focuses on a methodological issue in how common measures of wealth in 
comparative demographic studies conflate economic capacity with market opportunities, and 
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how this conceptual confusion biases our interpretations of the observed links between 
wealth and fertility over the course of the demographic transition.  A key piece to the puzzle 
of low fertility has been the mixed associations between measures of wealth and fertility 
across populations at different stages of the transition.  This chapter explores one potential 
reason for these perplexing findings.  The study suggests that many common measures of 
wealth do not simply capture economic capacity, but also reflect the history of access to 
market opportunities.  These two concepts, economic capacity and market opportunities, are 
suggested to have opposing effects on fertility in many contexts.  Studies that rely on wealth 
measures that conflate these two concepts may mistakenly attribute the negative impact of 
market opportunities on fertility to economic capacity.  In this way, the multi-faceted 
meaning of many wealth measures obscures researchers’ ability to draw inferences about the 
causal mechanisms underlying the relationship between wealth and fertility.   
The study proposes a method of disentangling economic capacity and market 
opportunities using multiple measures of wealth developed from household-level assets 
commonly found in demographic and health monitoring surveys.  These alternative 
measures of wealth (e.g. agricultural wealth) do not carry the same market-oriented biases as 
standard asset-based measures, and thus do not conflate economic capacity and market 
opportunities. Using these multiple measures of wealth from 472,812 households, across 
90,425 sampling clusters, across 114 surveys in 56 countries, the study employs a multi-
group latent variable structural equation model to estimate 1) latent variables capturing 
economic capacity and market opportunity and 2) their effects on completed family size.  
Market opportunities had a consistent negative effect on fertility, while economic capacity 
had a weaker but generally positive effect on fertility.  The results show that the confusion 
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between measures of wealth and the concepts of economic capacity can impede our 
understanding of how material resources shape reproductive decision making.   
These studies reflect a solid contribution to growing body of work in evolutionary 
demography, which focuses on the causes of within-population variation in fertility (Sear, 
Lawson, Kaplan, & Shenk, 2016).   By outlining potential pathways by which households 
access the novel economic opportunities provided by the spread of market economies, this 
work helps refine to refine evolutionary theories regarding human fertility.  Additionally, this 
works aids in clarifying the factors that shape parents’ reproductive decision-making, 
particularly in contexts characterized by both declining fertility and rising inequality.  In 
doing so, these studies point to new directions in understanding the reproductive trade-offs 
faced by parents in a wide-range of contexts, and contribute new evidence to the debates 





INEQUALITY IN MARKET INTEGRATION AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN 
FERTILITY IN GUATEMALA 
Abstract 
The transition to low fertility in Guatemala is characterized by ethnic differences 
between the indigenous Mayan population and the non-indigenous Ladino population.  
Consistent with economic theories of fertility, these ethnic differences in fertility reflect 
unequal access to market opportunities, with Mayan households having fewer economic 
incentives to limit fertility and invest in education. Using case studies from a community in 
the central highlands, this paper explores one explanation for these ethnic differences in 
market opportunities, investments in education, and fertility – Mayan households have fewer 
social resources needed to convert education into income.  First, I use qualitative data to 
show how reproductive norms reflect concerns for market access, primarily through 
investments in education.  Second, I explore the importance of social relationships in turning 
education into income, and how certain types of social relationships can also shape parental 
investment decisions.  Finally, given the importance of certain forms of social relationships, I 
review evidence that Mayan households have fewer social resources needed for turning 
education into income.  These observations highlight the importance of social relationships 
for leveraging education to succeed in the Guatemalan wage-labor economy, and their 
potential for shaping parental investment decisions.  This work presents an unexplored 
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explanation for ethnic disparities in fertility in Guatemala, as well as provides a novel 
extension to economic theories of fertility that argue low fertility is a result of parental 
investment decisions in wage-labor economies. 
 
Introduction 
In 2015, the national newspaper in Guatemala, The Prensa Libre, published an article on 
the population projection in Guatemala.  Summarizing data from the national census 
institute and drawing on a number of published reports regarding current fertility patterns, 
the article estimated the current population of 15 m would double to 30m in the next 15 
years.  A cursory examination of the social media reactions to the online article shows how 
many people in Guatemala feel about these population projections.  Many people 
commented that discussions regarding sex would become less taboo making it easier to 
implement better sexual education in the school system and rural areas.  Others felt 
imposing policies to limit the size of families, like policies in China during the last 30 years 
would be appropriate, with consequences for breaking the limit.   
Most telling were the comments regarding who were having the most children.  The 
comments made clear that Guatemalans see the rural poor, particularly indigenous 
populations as the largest contributor to population growth.  Historically they are right. 
Current demographic estimates show rural indigenous Mayan populations having 3.6 
children on average, with nearly a 1 child difference compared to their non-indigenous or 
Ladino counterparts (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social, Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística, & ICF International, 2017).  While the fertility rate declined from 5.6 to 3.1 
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births per woman in the last 30 years, the rate of decline was much slower than other Latin 
American Countries (De Broe & Hinde, 2006; Grace, 2008).  It took Guatemala close to 44 
years to see an overall decline in 2 children since 1960. By contrast, Bolivia took 34 years, 
whereas Honduras, el Salvador and Nicaragua saw a 2 child decline in approximately 25 
years (Guzmán, Rodríguez, Martínez, Contreras, & González, 2006) . In Guatemala, this 
stalled decline is characterized by large disparities across ethnic groups, rural and urban 
residence, as well as education and economic gradients (Grace, 2008; Grace & Sweeney, 
2016).  Indeed, the mean completed family size of urban residents in Guatemala City is 3.2. 
By contrast, the average completed family size is well over 6 children in rural areas in many 
parts of the country.   
Ethnic Disparities in Fertility and Unequal Market Opportunities 
So why do Guatemala’s poor rural indigenous have some of the highest fertility rates in 
the western hemisphere? The current state of the empirical literature on ethnic differences in 
fertility in Guatemala is relatively narrow in scope, focusing primarily on the supply and 
demand of family planning services  (Grace, 2009), particularly the disparities in access and 
uptake of modern family planning among the large indigenous populations (Santiso-Gálvez 
et al., 2015; Seiber & Bertrand, 2002; Ward, Bertrand, Puac, & Ward, 2013).   Spanish 
language fluency predicts greater uptake of family planning and reproductive health services 
(Grace, 2009; Ishida, Stupp, Turcios-Ruiz, William, & Espinoza, 2012).  Other research has 
suggested that strong ethnic and linguistic boundaries create barriers to the spread of 
modern fertility norms including attitudes towards contraception (De Broe & Hinde, 2006; 
Pebley & Stupp, 1987).  These language barriers have been argued to shape contraception 
uptake in Guatemala (Ward et al., 2013).  Economic arguments tout marginalization, 
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isolation, and poverty from preventing accessing and utilizing family planning and 
educational services (Ishida et al., 2012).   
Economic theories of the fertility decline argue that access to novel market 
opportunities drives down fertility as parents begin to perceive increasing benefits for high 
investments in education for themselves and their offspring (G. Becker, Murphy, & Tamura, 
1990; Handwerker, 1986; Kaplan, 1996; Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000; 
Snopkowski & Kaplan, 2014).  According to this view, the fertility decline reflects a 
demographic response to increasing access to market opportunities, with a demand for 
family planning emerging as a result of the social and economic benefits of lowering fertility.  
However, in heterogeneous populations, access to market opportunities is often unevenly 
distributed.  In the Guatemalan case, economic discrimination and exclusion along ethnic 
and linguistic lines plays a strong role in maintaining the social and economic disparities 
between indigenous and ladino populations (Hale, 2002; Mitchell, 2014; Mulongoy, 2012; 
Patrinos, Skoufias, & Lunde, 2007).  In such cases, populations with fewer access to market 
opportunities have less economic incentives to lower fertility and may have slower fertility 
declines than groups with better access to market opportunities.  
Consistent with this explanation, historical demographic analyses found the ethnic 
differences in fertility emerged during a period of increasing engagement in the market 
economy.  Early argued that in response to increasing land scarcity among the large, mixed-
ethnicity peasant population, Ladinos had the social and cultural capital to transition to 
wage-labor employment (Early, 1982).  This resulted in the divergence of fertility patterns, 
particularly among the rural populations in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The resulting 
fertility patterns showed a steeper decline among Ladino populations, with relatively little 
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change in fertility rates among indigenous populations.  However, by the end of the civil war 
in the mid 1990s, access to market opportunities increased for Mayan households.  
Demographic analysis by Grace and Sweeney found a sharp decline in fertility among the 
indigenous population during the years after the end of the civil war.  They argued that the 
social and cultural changes associated with the peace accords opened both educational and 
market opportunities to Mayan households (Grace & Sweeney, 2016).   The increased rate of 
decline among Mayan households was attributed to a reduction in barriers in market 
opportunities as the government expanded funding and commitment to educational and 
health services including efforts to recognize the indigenous populations (ibid).  Neoliberal 
economic reforms opened avenues for pursuing market opportunities 
Despite these changes in the late 90s and early 2000s, the socioeconomic benefits of low 
fertility high investment strategies are still less for Mayan households compared to Ladinos.  
In addition to historically having fewer opportunities to access market opportunities, when 
Mayan families did invest in education in order to improve access, they saw less economic 
benefit compared to their ladino counterparts.  Analysis of wage differentials of the late 
1980s through early 2000s show that on average, Mayan households were getting less for the 
same level of education as their Ladino counterparts  (Patrinos, 2000; Psacharopoulos, 2005; 
Shapiro, 2006).  Interpretations reflect discrimination and exclusion on the job market.  
This exclusion from employment opportunities in the wage-labor economy are reflected 
in the sources of income for Mayan households.  Isolation and fragmentation have restricted 
the types of market opportunities available to indigenous people to diversify their income. 
Recent economic analyses found most of indigenous peoples’ income in both rural and 
urban areas was generated by self-employment, while Ladinos had higher proportions of 
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income coming from salaries or formal jobs(Patrinos & Skoufias, 2007).  Additionally, 
income from non-labor sources showed Ladinos had higher proportion of income from 
capital sources, such as interest, investments, rents, retirement pension, and private and 
public transfers.  This higher proportion of income from non-labor sources was observed in 
both rural and urban contexts.   Even when self-employed, Mayans tend to make less than 
their Ladino counterparts do.   In his ethnographic research on the Chor’ti Maya, Metz 
describes how Mayan households supplement subsistence agriculture by selling crafts and 
agricultural products (Metz, 2001).  However, the profits tended to average less than $2 per 
week, as they were subjected to exploitation by Ladino intermediaries who were able to earn 
2 to 5 times the original price. 
Given these contexts, economic theories of fertility predict that Mayan households see 
fewer benefits from limiting fertility and investing in education compared to Ladinos.  
Empirical patterns of both reproduction and parental investment in education are consistent 
with these theories.  First, Mayans still have higher overall fertility and earlier transition to 
parenthood than Ladinos.   
Second, national patterns show large ethnic disparities in school enrollment, with Mayan 
children spending less overall time in formal education.  Importantly, schooling creates 
economic trade-offs in the household, as child labor can make significant contributions to 
the household through paid wage-labor or unpaid domestic or childcare work .  National 
patterns of child labor show that indigenous children are more likely to contribute 
economically to the household than Ladinos.  Furthermore, indigenous children are more 
likely to quit school to contribute labor to the household.  Finally, differences ethnicity 
related achievement gaps reflect opportunity structures in communities.  Recent analysis 
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regarding ethnicity-related achievement gaps found community characteristics had larger and 
more prominent effects than school or classroom characteristics (Marshall, 2009).   These 
authors argue that these community effects may reflect the local opportunity structures that 
motivate investment and persistence in education. 
“Indigenous students and their families may be less sanguine about the future 
payoffs to schooling, perhaps because cultural and /or physical isolation reduces 
access to urban labor markets.   (Marshall, 2009)” 
In summary, employment and school enrollment patterns suggest that  Mayan 
households have less opportunities to turn education into income, compared to Ladino 
households.  As such, the relatively higher fertility of the Mayan population reflects the 
lower economic incentives to reduce fertility and increase parental investments in education.  
One explanation for the differences in the returns to education and the investment in 
education by Mayan households is that they lack the types of social and cultural resources 
necessary for success in market economies. Indeed, Early argued that language barriers 
restricted Mayan populations ability to respond to increasing land-pressure the same way 
Ladinos did.  
In addition to cultural resources like language fluency, social networks are important 
resources for accessing market opportunities.  A large body of literature in sociology has 
documented the economic relevance of social networks in market economies, particularly for 
accessing the types of high-income jobs that require high levels of formal education (Burt, 
2001; Glaeser, Laibson, & Sacerdote, 2002; Granovetter, 1973; Van Der Gaag & Snijders, 
2005). In competitive market economies, social relationships can be leveraged to access high 
16 
income, skills-based employment opportunities. Households with these social resources face 
greater economic incentive to pursue education.  Indeed the ability to turn education into 
high-income employment often requires knowing the right people.  Furthermore, these 
economic effects of social capital are likely stronger among populations where inequality and 
structural barriers limit opportunities for capitalizing on the long-term investments in 
education and other forms of embodied capital (Patrinos 1997). 
Social connections do have an impact on access to employment in Guatemala. A recent 
analysis from the World found that the use of references from social contacts was the most 
common strategy for acquiring employment in Guatemala with about 37% of surveyed 
workers having found their occupation through word-of-mouth (Fazio, 2007). 
These insights from sociology provide a novel extension to economic theories of 
fertility decline, and a relatively unexplored mechanism underlying ethnic differences in 
fertility in Guatemala.  If Mayan households lack the appropriate social connections, relative 
to Ladino households, this may account for the lower income returns to investments in 
education, resulting in less incentives for reduced fertility and increased investments in 
education.   
The Current Study 
The current study offers a first step toward assessing the hypothesis that social 
relationships can shape parental investment decisions, resulting in downstream effects on 
fertility. Using ethnographic data from a town center of a municipality in the central 
highlands, I present cases that illustrate how social access to market opportunities shape 
parental investment decisions.  I first outline how reproductive norms reflect the concern for 
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accessing market opportunities primarily by emphasizing the role of education in shaping 
reproductive decisions.  Using case studies, I then outline how social connections are a key 
channel by which households convert education into income, and how social connections 
can motivate investments in education.  These case studies highlight how the interaction of 
both education and social connections are required to gain access to good jobs.  In some 
cases, those with proper education but lack the social connections cannot get access to the 
jobs they are qualified for. Finally, having the right kinds of social connections can shape 
parents’ decisions about investing in education for their children. Finally, I review national 
data and previous research that suggests Mayan households have fewer social resources 
needed for successfully converting education into success in the wage-labor economy.   
The data comes from household surveys and ethnographic interviews conducted by the 
author and students in the Community Health and Medical Anthropology Field school 
associated with Arizona State University.  The field school offers global health and other 
undergraduates hands-on experience in the research process.  Each field season, 8-15 
undergraduate students conduct household surveys with 100-200 households in the town 
center and surrounding neighborhoods (Table 1.).  The primary case studies are taken from 
ethnographic field notes and semi-structured interviews conducted over the summer field 
seasons (June-Aug) from 2012 up through 2017.   
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Figure 1.  Age-Specific Fertility by Ethnicity and Residence.  The age-specific 
fertility estimates by ethnicity and residence from the Demographic and Health Monitoring 
Surveys (DHS). Rural fertility (black lines) showed little differences in 1987.  However, by 
the mid-1990s Ladinos (solid lines) were having fewer children, primarily at later ages.  By 
2015 the gap was clearly observable at nearly all ages.  In urban contexts (gray lines) Ladinos 
have consistently shown lower fertility at nearly all ages. However, in the most recent 
estimates, ethnic differences in fertility have decreased for women 35 and younger.   
Additional data were collected over the 5 years in small supplemental projects.   In 2014 
I conducted semi-structured interviews of 20 adults using convenience sampling in town, 
with questions focusing on perceived problems of different reproductive patterns. In 2015 
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we conducted 25 in-person follow-up interviews which focused on ideas around what made 
a good or bad parent and the appropriate timing of transitioning to parenthood.  Finally, in 
2016 I used convenience sampling to conduct 20 interviews on perceived employment 
opportunities in the town.  The semi-structured questionnaire focused on the types of 
employment opportunities that were available for residence who completed different levels 
of education.   













N 92 106 44 60 56 70 
Median 
Income 
450Q 560Q - - 600Q 790Q 
Age 36 (12) 42 (15) 39  (12) 40 (14) 35 (11) 41 (15) 
Household 
Size 
5.4 4.9 5.4 4.7 - - 
       
Table 1. Selected descriptives of the household-level surveys. 
Field Site  
The field site is a semirural municipality in the southern part of the department of 
Chimaltenango in the central highlands of Guatemala, with a population of around 23,000 
with roughly 9,000 living in the town center.  The peri-urban town center, located in the 
center of the municipality in the valley of the Cocoyá River, is surrounded by six aldeas or 
smaller rural communities, and over 40 different fincas or coffee plantations (Matas Oria 
Francisco, Archila Serrano, Benítez, & Vega Solórzano, 2006). The municipality is roughly 
80 km from Guatemala City, and 35 km from the department capital of Chimaltenango.   
The surrounding aldeas and fincas are predominantly indigenous, in the town center, 
the population is closely split between indigenous Kaqchikel Mayan and non-indigenous 
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Ladino populations. The Kaqchikel represent one of the more dominant Mayan language 
groups, with a large, economically diverse population located in the central highlands.  It is 
the second largest Mayan language group with roughly 500,000 speakers (Metz and Webb).  
This mixed community in the town center is different from the more predominantly 
Kaqchikel communities in the department of Chimaltenango in the central highlands. While 
a number of households still speak Kaqchikel, nearly all households speak Spanish as their 
primary language. As is the case for most other indigenous populations in Guatemala, ethnic 
identity is prominently displayed for women through their clothing, while men have given up 
traditional clothing decades ago.   
Coffee production is the primary economic base and source of income for the area.   
This results in seasonal ebb and flow of employment.  The plantation context has resulted in 
wealthy landowners and a handful of households working as managers.  Data from the most 
recent census (2002) in Guatemala show that an estimated 70% of agricultural workers are 
day laborers while only 30% are producers or owners of their own plots.  Outside of these 
opportunities, there are limited manufacturing and service industry jobs in the town center.  
Municipal government, local schools and health clinics, and a handful of NGO’s offer few 
of the only sources of formal employment in the town.  The local economy in the town 
center is dominated by informal jobs, particularly household-level business such as running 
tiendas, restaurants, shops and internet cafes out of the house. Additionally, all members of 
the household have opportunities to work in the fields during coffee harvests, and as day-
laborers for agricultural operations in other central highland communities.  Women also find 
work in childcare and domestic chores for some of the few wealthy households in town, 
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with house cleaning and laundry seen as primary employment opportunities for many 
women.  
There are accessible educational opportunities in the town center, with three primary 
schools.  One primary school is the free national school, which enrolls approximately 600 
students.  The other two primary schools are private religious school with approximately 
100-125 students each.  Both private schools require roughly a 4.50 monthly enrollment fee 
with required uniforms.  Additionally, there are middle schools and vocational schools in 
town, although opportunities for education beyond high school require one to two hour 
trips outside of the community.  Coffee harvest during the months of November through 
February results in high rates of school absence  as the majority of the population between 8 
and 17 are engaged in agricultural work to contribute to the household (Matas Oria 
Francisco et al., 2006). 
There is a range of employment opportunities outside of the town, but most can be 
classified into low- and high-income work.  Low-income work is manual labor in the fields 
in other central highland towns that produce non-traditional exports.  Many individuals work 
as day laborers in the fields surrounding Patzicia, a larger neighboring urban center.  This 
work typically yields 40-70Q (~$3-10 US) for a day’s labor and typically involves harvesting 
non-traditional exports, such as carrots, cabbage, and broccoli.   For men, albeñils are day 
laborers who perform menial labor such as construction both in town and in other highland 
communities.  High-income employment is found outside of the town, primarily in 
Chimaltenango, the department capital.  These are typically both blue and white-collar 
occupations.  Opportunities for these services in the town center are limited.  Few 
individuals commute daily to the capital, Guatemala City, for school and work.  And while 
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local diversificado training programs are offered in town for nurses, mechanics, accountants, 
and computer science technicians, these programs are preparing students for jobs that 
almost certainly require seeking employment outside of town.  
Data from all years of the household survey show a wide range of material wealth 
reflected in the diversity of occupations, estimates of 2-week income, and asset ownership 
(Table 1).  Median household 2-week income were typically between 500-700 Quetzals ($65 
to $91 dollars per two-week) which equates to roughly $130-$182 US dollars per month.  
Similar to national patterns, Mayan households in Acatenango have lower socioeconomic 
standing.    In the 2012 data, only 39% of surveyed Mayan households fell above the 
community median income, whereas 57% of Ladino households did.  Furthermore, surveyed 
Mayan households had significantly lower two-week incomes during the time of the 
interviews (Mayan Mean=436Q, N=92, SD=453, Ladino Mean 874, N=106, SD=1352). 
Using the same 2012 dataset, we estimated household wealth quintiles from household 
construction and assets.  Collapsing the wealth index into quintiles showed Mayan 
households are more likely represented in the lower economic quintiles.  Finally, greater 
levels of food insecurity are observed among Mayan households. These ethnic differences in 
two-week income were also observed in the later 2017 survey data.  The 2017 data showed 
large ethnic differences in reported bi-weekly income with Ladino households reporting 
1440Q (~185$ US) every two weeks, compared to 885Q (114$ US) for Mayan households.   
Similar to national patterns, adults and adolescents in the community endorsed low-
fertility norms.   The 2015 household survey asked female heads of the household about 
reproductive preferences and ideals for both boys and girls.  The ideal age at marriage for 
boys was on average 24 years old with slightly younger ideals for girls (23.6 years old).  The 
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ideal age to start a family was 25 for boys and 24.3 for girls.  The short time between 
marriage and starting a family suggest that residents in town see marriage and starting a 
family as more of a single transition that two milestones in life.  The pilot study in 2013 
found similar results with a convenience sample of 24 adults in town.  In this study, the ideal 
age at marriage was 24.3 for young people today, and the ideal age for starting a family was 
24.8 years. This ideal age at marriage and first birth is well above reported actual ages for 
Guatemala as a whole (21.3 urban and 20.0 rural), and the department of Chimaltenango 
(21.2).  (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social et al., 2017).  In the 2015 household 
survey, the mean ideal number of children a young couple should desire to have is 2.5 kids.  
The 2013 sample found a mean ideal of 2.6.  These ideal numbers of children are consistent 
with responses in nationally representative surveys, particularly in urban settings where (2.8 
for women 15-49, ENSMI 2015).  Ideal number of children in the community was lower 
than the overall department average of an ideal of 3.4 children. 
The ideal family size and timing of the transition to parenthood in the community fit 
with low fertility high-investment reproductive strategies.  Adolescent and young people 
desire small families, want to start the transition to marriage and parenthood later than their 
parents, and hope that their own offspring will be able to focus on schooling and 
development without having to make economic contributions to the household (CITE 
Maupin paper).  Discussion about the timing and number of children during these interviews 
centered around the ability of parents to use education to find work to support their 
children, and for parents to ensure their children are able to pursue education.  In this 
context, education is seen as the primary means by which individuals access better 
employment opportunities.   
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Qualitative Data 
Social relationships as channels for accessing market opportunities 
The importance placed on education, and its links with ideals around timing and 
number of children highlight how households’ concerns for accessing market opportunities 
influences reproductive norms.  Here, education is seen as the central determinant of 
opening employment opportunities.  However, in this community other pathways are 
important for accessing market opportunities.  Social relationships are a key channel through 
which individuals access employment opportunities. Informal discussions with participants 
revealed that most participants who did not work for themselves gained access to their jobs 
through some form of social connections.   
During the 2016 interviews about employment opportunities in town, respondents 
often mentioned that people with little education would only have opportunities for work 
that required a patron.  For women with little education, options were limited to childcare, 
domestic work like laundry or house cleaning, or self-employment through selling food or 
handicrafts.  For men with little education, job opportunities were solely found int the 
agricultural sector, either in the coffee fincas or as day-laborers on farms in nearby highland 
communities.  Most if not all of these opportunities require social relationships to wealthy 
land and homeowners, or to middlemen who find workers.  Alternatively, family 
relationships are often relied upon for finding work, particularly when family members start 
or own a business.  The story of a local shop-owner highlights the role of social connections 
in finding work.  Their family story was shared with research assistants and the field school 
director who was fluent in Kaqchikel.  
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[CASE STUDY – One Mayan family owns three of the most successful tiendas in town.  
The family had moved to town years ago and purchased a home with a storefront which had been 
converted into a tienda.  The home front convenience stores are common in Latin America, and are 
a key form of informal self-employment in Guatemala.  While the work is not as physically 
demanding as agricultural work, tienda owners in towns and aldeas work long hours in their stores 
and need to make frequent trips to the department capital or Guatemala City to buy wholesale.  
Running stores out of the house is one of the few business opportunities households have in town to 
start a business. These stores are ubiquitous in Guatemalan communities, such that every 
neighborhood has multiple tiendas.   
The man’s first tienda was purchased near the town entrance.  This favorable location attracted 
enough business that the family was able to save enough money to purchase two more stores in other 
neighborhoods in town.  In order to find workers in their new stores, the family hired cousins and in-
laws who lived in other highland communities.  These extended family members moved from their 
home communities, brought their families, and found housing in town.  The move represented a 
significant uprooting for the incoming workers. These family members were Kaqchikel speakers and 
came from a predominantly Kaqchikel aldea outside of an urban center in the neighboring 
department.  The women’s traditional traje or clothing clearly marked them as outsiders to the 
community.  While these family members had their own small plot of land in their home community, 
to make ends meat they needed to work in other people’s fields as day-laborers.  The work in the 
tiendas represents a modest increase in the wages earned by these extended family members. 
This entrepreneurial family ended up providing employment for many of their extended family 
members.  This dynamic of relying on extended kin ties to find work, or offering employment 
opportunities to extended kin is typical of Guatemalans. Furthermore, having connections in town 
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who could give work was the primary motivation for these extended family members to relocate their 
families to the community.] 
The dynamic of relying on social connections to find work is well documented in 
Guatemala (Patrinos et al., 2007).  In this context, the job opportunity provided by family 
members was enough to motivate rural to urban migration for a number of extended and in-
law family members.  Importantly, relying on social connections to find work is not just a 
strategy for those working in the informal sector.  Individuals can also access high-paying 
professional work through social connections.  For example, analyses of national 
employment data showed that 64% of salaried workers in the private sector obtained their 
positions through the use of social contacts (Fazio, 2007).  For some, investments in 
education may not turn out when individuals are lacking the connections necessary to find 
high-income employment. During a pilot project with interviews focused on employment 
opportunities in town a participant shared the story of how her college educated husband 
was unable to find suitable work. 
[CASE STUDY – One interview with a Mayan woman highlights the importance of social 
connections for finding high-income work for those who complete post-secondary education.  She lived 
in a poor neighborhood in town.  During the interview, she mentioned her husband had completed 
his equivalent to a bachelor’s degree in computer science in the department capital.  This level of 
education was unusual for residents in town, and even more rare for residents in her neighborhood.  
She described how he looked for work as an IT professional for months both in the department 
capital and in Guatemala City. However, after months of not being able to find work as an IT 
professional, he was able to find a job in the city working for an industrial chicken processing plant.  
His father-in-law worked at the plant and was able to find him a position.  It was an entry-level 
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position but it still paid more than alternatives in town.  She explained how difficult a decision it 
was for her husband to take the position, but even as an entry -level position it still paid more than 
the alternatives available in town.  He had committed to continue to look for work as an IT 
professional, but he had been at the chicken processing for five years at the time of the interview.] 
This is a clear example of how, in many cases, education is not sufficient for accessing 
good jobs.  While the husband had completed his post-secondary education, without social 
connections he was unable to find work through formal means using his skillset.  However, 
he was able to secure a well-paying job in the city through social connections.  By contrast, 
when education is paired with good social connections, individuals can have much better 
outcomes. During the same pilot project, I interviewed the local minister who shared his 
story of how he and his wife came to Acatenango. 
[CASE STUDY - The minister of the evangelical church, whose salary is an order of 
magnitude greater than the town median not only found out about the job opening through his 
father’s social connections, but was hired because of it. The minister was a ladino man in his mid-
40s who lived in the town center close to the town entrance in a relatively wealthier neighborhood.  
While interviewing him regarding his opinions on employment opportunities in town he recalled how 
he first came to the community. His father had been a long-time pastor in another highland 
community.  Much of social life in the Guatemalan highlands revolves around the church, and his 
fathers’ position as a church leader offered privileged access to a broad network of social connections.  
His father had learned that the church in the community was going to be in need of a minister.  His 
father had known some of the members of the church and was able to put in a good word with the 
church leadership.  His father was able to secure a position for him as the new minister precisely 
28 
because he had early access to information about the job opening, and because he had connections to 
the church] 
Positions of power within the church are one highly valuable relationship, not only for 
developing broad networks but for leveraging connections into opportunities for individuals 
and their children.  Another highly valuable relationship is having a connection to the local 
municipal elected officials.  In the community, employment at the school or health center, 
often requires having favorable connections in the local municipality government.  As an 
example, those who are qualified for a position but lack the appropriate connections may not 
get the job.  The school director shared this story one afternoon while the field school was 
conducting a project with students in the public primary school.  
[CASE STUDY – A women who had worked for the local public elementary school decided 
to get more education in order to apply for a job as a teacher.  Because her mother was the school 
director, and her father was a teacher that had been employed the longest in the school, she was 
certain she would be able to get a job there.  She had worked for the school previously doing 
receptionist and office administrative work.  She had enrolled in a training program in order to 
become qualified to be a teacher.  When she finished her training and was eligible to apply for a 
teaching position, both parents told her the school had a position open.  However, when she applied 
for the position at the local municipality office, she was turned down and was told that there were no 
available positions at the school at the time.  She was certain there was a position available since her 
mother was the director.  Both her and her mother claim that she didn’t get the job because they were 
not friends of the head of the municipal government.  During the most recent local election, both her 
and her mother had voted for the opponent of the current mayor.]  
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These two case studies highlight the importance of the right kinds of social connections 
in obtaining valuable employment opportunities, and that education in the absence of such 
social connections may bear little fruit.  The former case highlights the importance of 
connections that facilitate the exposure to novel sources of information.  Sociologists call 
these ties bridging relationships  and have focused on how information flows across these 
relationships can be leveraged into new opportunities in market economies (Burt, 2001; N. 
Lin & Erickson, 2008; Michael Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).  The latter case highlights the 
importance of what sociologists call “linking connections” or those bridging connections 
that connect to positions above individuals in social hierarchies (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004).  
In summary, education is necessary but not sufficient for accessing high-income jobs in the 
central highlands, or elsewhere.   However, having the right mix of education and social 
connections can improve ability to turn education into income.  Positions that bridge groups 
or those in positions of power within the church or local governments are key relationships 
here.   
Having the right connections can influence parental investment decisions 
The existence of such relationships can also influence parents’ decisions to invest in 
higher-education for their children.  Households that have these forms of social connections 
may see more certain outcomes for their long-term investments in education. As these social 
relationships can be leveraged into better, higher paying jobs, those households that have 
them may also see higher potential benefits to costly investments in education, particularly 
those in above primary schooling.  During my first field season in town, a family I was 
staying with shared their story about choosing to send their teenage son to college in the 
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next town over, describing how social connections played a role in their willingness to pay 
for expensive schooling. 
 [CASE STUDY – Attending community college: One Ladino family who lived in a nice 
home in a nice neighborhood close to the entrance of the town had a son who was attending a local 
community college in the next town over.  The family was small, just a mother and her two sons, but 
there home was part of a larger compound that connected with households of extended family 
members.  The household had a small plot of land that stretched out behind the house as well as 
plots in the hills.  In addition to producing their own small amounts of coffee on the land, the family 
had connections to coffee fincas in the hills surrounding the town as well as connections to farms 
growing produce in other central highland communities.  Both sons were enrolled in school. The eldest 
was attending the Universidad Rural de Guatemala, pursuing the equivalent to an associate’s degree 
in agricultural engineering. He was planning on taking a management position in one of the farms 
or fincas that his family had connections to. These management positions in farms and fincas offer 
greater job security as they are year-round work, whereas most work on the farms and fincas revolve 
around seasonal harvests.  Tuition at the university was expensive.  These connections frequently 
made their way into discussions regarding the households’ decisions to send their child to community 
college. The son was explicit when talking about pursuing higher-education was motivated by the 
connections that he could leverage to find a management position in nearby farms. He wasn’t 
interested in moving to the city to find good paying work, rather he liked the rural environment.] 
In this case the family chose to pursue post-secondary primarily because the family had 
connections that could be leveraged into a job opportunity for their son. Specialization in 
secondary and post-secondary education often requires families to have clear connections to 
the field  
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Ethnicity and social connections 
Ethnographic case studies from the field site highlights the importance of social 
connections in turning education into income in Guatemala, and how social connections 
may influence parental investment decisions in ways that are consistent with low-fertility 
strategies.  Here I review evidence from recent analyses that show there are clear ethnic 
differences in the role of social connections in accessing employment opportunities (Fazio, 
2007; Lunde, Skoufias, & Patrinos, 2007).  These analyses show Mayan households have 
fewer social resources necessary for success in competitive wage-labor economies compared 
to their Ladino counterparts.   
Using data collected from La Encuesta Nacional de Empleo e Ingresos -ENEI- 
(National Survey of Employment and Income),  Fazio analyzed job-seeking behaviors, and 
the reliance on social contacts to find employment across ethnic lines and across contexts in 
Guatemala (Fazio, 2007).  The results showed Mayans are more likely to rely on social 
connections to find work in rural areas, in low-education contexts, and in the informal or 
agricultural sectors relative to Ladinos.  On the other hand, Ladinos are more likely to use 
social contacts to obtain employment in urban settings, in high education categories, and in 
the formal sector (firms with more than 6 employees and contribute to social security 
system).  
Moreover, the ENEI dataset distinguished between receiving help from family 
members and receiving help from politicians or friends.  These two categories can be 
considered proxies for social relationships that have different strengths.  Indigenous workers 
tended to use help from relative more than Ladinos, while Ladinos were more likely to draw 
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on friends or politicians in obtaining employment (Fazio, 2007).  These differences suggest 
that the contacts available to Mayan households do not provide access to high income jobs 
in urban settings that require high levels of education.  In these settings Mayans have to rely 
more on formal methods of obtaining jobs.  
In summary, analyses of job seeking behaviors at the national level reveal ethnic 
differences in the role and value of social connections across rural and urban contexts and 
across varying levels of education.  Consistent with the framework being explored here, the 
evidence suggests that Mayan households have fewer stocks of social resources that promote 
social mobility in competitive wage-labor economies relative to their Ladino counterparts.  
Furthermore, their reliance on social contacts to find employment in the informal sector 
with low paid, unskilled jobs, may lead to the fewer and fewer opportunities for social 
mobility as these reinforce homogenous social relationships among unskilled workers (Fazio, 
2007).  
Discussion 
The ethnographic data and case studies presented here highlight the importance of 
social connections in household’s abilities to turn education into income. Furthermore, they 
highlight the importance of specific types of social connections, and the difficulties of 
investing in education without social opportunities for finding work.  These social 
connections can influence parent’s decisions to invest in higher levels of education, as 
employment and income outcomes are more certain among those with the right types of 
connections.  Finally, national-level analysis reveals clear ethnic differences in the role of 
social networks in finding work.  Relative to Ladinos, Mayan households, who have fewer 
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social resources to access market opportunities have lower economic incentives to reduce 
fertility and increase investments in education.   
These data support prominent theories of fertility decline which emphasize the 
reproductive costs associated with market opportunities as a primary driver of fertility 
declines (G. Becker et al., 1990; Kaplan & Lancaster, 2000; Robinson, 1997).  According to 
these theories, the high costs of education necessary for success in market economies drives 
down fertility. However, in Guatemala, education is not the sole determinant of success in 
the job market. The perspective outlined here suggests that differences in social connections 
may account for ethnic differences in parental investment in education and fertility between 
Mayan and Ladino populations.   
Anthropologists and demographers have explored the importance of social relationships 
in shaping the fertility decline (Bereczkei, 1998; Mathews & Sear, 2013; Newson, Postmes, 
Lea, & Webley, 2005; Sear & Dickins, 2010).  However, these studies tend to focus on the 
direct benefits to the costs of rearing children, rather than the long-term economic benefits 
of certain types of social relationships.   The current study offers an outline for examining 
how social relationships shifts the long-term economic considerations households make 
regarding reproduction.  
Future work should focus on how social relationships influence household’s economic 
calculations surrounding reproductive decisions, with an emphasis on future returns of 
education rather than on current costs of children.  Additionally, data regarding the structure 
and content of household and individual-level social networks will be necessary in order to 
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test the importance of different types of social connections on parental investment and 
reproductive behaviors.  
This work presents an unexplored explanation for ethnic disparities in fertility in 
Guatemala, as well as provides a novel extension to economic theories of fertility that argue 
low fertility is a result of parental investment decisions in wage-labor economies.   By 
outlining pathways by which households access employment opportunities created by 
market economies, this work helps refine economic theories of fertility declines.  
Additionally, this works aids in clarifying the factors that shape parents’ reproductive 
decision-making, particularly in contexts characterized by both declining fertility and rising 
inequality.  In doing so, this study points to new directions in understanding the 
reproductive trade-offs faced by parents and how differences in these trade-offs can 




 EDUCATION AND ACCESSING OPPORTUNITIES: HOUSEHOLD SOCIAL 
CAPITAL EFFECTS ON SCHOOL ENROLLMENT IN GUATEMALA 
Abstract 
Theories of parental investment predict that parents will invest in their children’s 
education when it is likely to contribute to future economic success.  Accordingly, parental 
decisions should depend on the future opportunities they expect their children will have to 
leverage education into better-paying jobs.  Here, we examine how one proxy of future 
opportunities—a household’s social connections to outside individuals and entities—is 
associated with parental investment in their children’s schooling—as proxied by school 
enrollment.  We use nationally representative data from 11,680 school-aged children (7-18) 
from Guatemala to assess the effects of household social connections—through 
membership in voluntary associations and engagement in collective activities—on school 
enrollment.  Findings indicate that household stocks of social capital are positively associated 
with school enrollment.  However, these effects are strongest for those children with the 
fewest opportunities - indigenous girls.  Notably, all else equal, any disparities in enrollment 
between indigenous and Ladino children disappear when indigenous households have social 
connections fostered through group-membership and participation in collective activities.  
These results highlight a relatively unexplored pathway by which social connections shape 
parental investment decisions, particularly in the contexts characterized by inequality in 
employment opportunities.   
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Introduction 
Among animals, humans have a uniquely long period of juvenile dependence 
coupled with extensive care from parents and allo-parents.  This extended period provides 
unique opportunities for learning the skills and knowledge necessary to adapt to novel social 
and ecological contexts (Flinn & Ward, 2005; K. Hill & Kaplan, 1999; Kaplan et al., 2000).  
However, it also presents parents with novel trade-offs as they must make tough choices 
about how to invest in their children’s learning and development.  Optimal parental 
investments in offspring are ecologically contingent (Quinlan, 2007), and are hypothesized to 
rely on evolved psychological mechanisms to navigate these trade-offs (Del Giudice, Kaplan, 
& Gangestad, 2004; Snopkowski & Kaplan, 2014). While such choices have always existed, 
modern educational systems and market economies have created a new set of trade-offs that 
parents must negotiate as they decide whether to bear the direct and indirect costs of 
sending a child to school. These trade-offs involve balancing the short and long-term costs 
and benefits of formal education.  
Broadly, the benefits to increased formal schooling are well-known.  Competitive 
wage-labor economies can increase the importance of skills acquired through formal 
education and training (G. S. Becker & Tomes, 1994; Chi & Qian, 2016; Kaplan, 1996).  
Education is positively associated with income, and is a primary means for social and 
economic mobility in market economies (Colclough, Kingdon, & Patrinos, 2010; Vila, 2000).  
In addition to gains in the job market, formal education is important for a number of other 
things including health (Cutler & Lleras-Muney, 2006) and reproduction (Bongaarts, 2003; 
Martin, 1995; Snopkowski, Towner, Shenk, & Colleran, 2016), child growth and 
development (McCrary & Royer, 2011).  
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While education can confer benefits, investments in schooling carry direct and 
indirect costs that can present heavy economic burdens for parents and households  
(Admassie, 2003; Ananga, 2011).  Parents typically pay for school fees, supplies, uniforms, 
transportations, and suffer indirect costs such as limiting the ability of offspring to 
contribute to the household production.  Children can make economic and labor 
contributions to the household through paid employment, unpaid agricultural and domestic 
labor (Bock, 2002).  Offspring can be an important source of allocare, helping parents cover 
the costs of increasing fertility (Kramer, 2005; Kramer & Ellison, 2010). Furthermore, these 
immediate opportunity costs may vary according to the types of livelihood opportunities 
available (Hedges, Borgerhoff Mulder, James, & Lawson, 2016).  
Another consideration when choosing to invest in schooling is that the long-term 
returns to schooling can be uncertain and variable, depending on access and distribution of 
opportunities to use education for social and economic mobility.  A key assumption in 
evolutionary and economic theories of human capital is that in competitive skill-intensive 
market economies, education is the primary determinant of success.  However, a number of 
factors unrelated to education, such as local demand for educated workforce, social and 
economic discrimination, and social opportunities to find jobs, can shape the distribution of 
employment and market opportunities in ways that determine the costs and benefits of 
educational investments (Neill, 2010; Patrinos, 2000; Verhaeghe, Van der Bracht, & Van de 
Putte, 2015).   
For example, the importance of skills attained through formal education are more 
directly tied to wage-income in urban environments where the demand for skilled-labor is 
higher than in rural environments. Subsistence strategies in urban environments are based on 
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income and wages, which often rely on skills learned through formal education.  This results 
in overall higher opportunity costs for non-educational activities, and lower net-gains for 
childhood labor contributions in urban settings.  Case studies in Fiji show that parents who 
invest in their children’s education are more motivated to migrate to urban locations as a 
means of increasing access to employment opportunities (Neill, 2010).  Furthermore, self-
reported data among the same population found higher non-school workloads for rural 
children, suggesting that urban children face steeper opportunity costs for labor 
contributions to the household (Mattison & Neill, 2013; Neill, 2011). 
Ethnic and racial discrimination in both formal state institutions and labor markets 
can also lower the long-term payouts to education in marginalized groups. Indeed, early 
work in economics on race and gender discrimination in labor markets defined 
discrimination as the differential returns to investments in human capital (G. S. Becker, 
1957). These early models described how discrimination among employees, employers, or 
consumers could push marginalized groups into a more limited number of jobs with lower 
pay and fewer opportunities to negotiate for higher wages (Carnoy, 1996).  As a result, 
families from disadvantaged backgrounds may expect less overall returns to investments in 
education, and therefore be less willing to invest in the education of their offspring (Hill and 
Kaplan 1999). 
Discrimination in the job market can reflect broader disenfranchisement from formal 
state institutions accompanying market economies.   Groups who face structural barriers to 
access of formal state institutions and market opportunities often rely on informal social 
relationships for . These relationships can shape parental investment decisions in several 
ways, including the ways in which parents mobilize resources for parental investments.  For 
 39 
example, Shenk found class-based differences in how parents financed offspring weddings in 
south India.  Professional-class parents preferred the use of formal institutions, such as bank 
loans and savings, while working-class parents relied more on credit from family and friends 
(Shenk, 2005).  Informal social relationships can provide reliable sources of social insurance 
and support when groups face structural barriers or discrimination in accessing formal 
institutions like public services, markets, and social safety nets.  
Social Relationships Shaping Long-Term Returns to Education 
Residential ecology and ethnic discrimination are only two of the better known 
factors that shapes access to skill-dependent employment opportunities. Social relationships 
can also alter the long-term payouts to parental investment in education in other ways.  One 
explanation for the wage-gap of different population sub-groups is variation in the 
distribution of certain types of social relationships that offer access to economic 
opportunities. Differences in parental networks may explain differences in lifetime earnings 
of college graduates who were raised in different economic classes in the US  (Hershbein, 
2016a, 2016b). Broader, more heterogeneous social networks can also provide an economic 
advantage in market economies (Burt, 2001; Granovetter, 1973).   
Indeed sociologists have long linked the formation of human capital and social 
capital as reciprocal, with social capital necessary for the cultivation of human capital 
(Coleman, 1988; Glaeser et al., 2002; S. Lin & Huang, 2005), and conversely, human capital 
improving employment outcomes precisely through producing greater social capital 
(Friedman & Krackhardt, 1997).  These authors suggest that it is the process of producing 
social capital from human capital that creates group-level differences in returns to education.  
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Social and cultural differences can limit income gains from education on the job market as 
those who are more socially and culturally different from the dominant group are less able to 
parlay education into greater social capital. 
Households rich in the right types of social resources may then perceive higher, 
more certain returns to investments in education.  Furthermore, as marginalized groups rely 
more on tight-knit social relationships for insurance and economic buffering, they may lose 
opportunities to cultivate more diverse relationships in a broader social network (Portes, 
1998).  
The idea that social relationships promote and constrain access to resources and 
opportunities is not new to evolutionary anthropology.  Status and relational wealth have 
been key concepts in recent anthropological studies of fitness, with several studies focusing 
on how certain types of relationships can alter the costs of heavy parental investments 
(Bereczkei, 1998; Mathews & Sear, 2013; Sear & Coall, 2011).  However, these studies 
emphasize how kin-ties affect the number and timing of having children, rather than the 
amounts of investments parents put into each child. Furthermore, these studies focus on the 
role of kin in providing direct childcare in offspring, which lower the costs of childrearing 
for parents.   
Evolutionary frameworks prioritize kinship because of the strong evidence 
supporting predictions derived from inclusive fitness theory; however, relational wealth is 
conceptually broader than simply kin-based ties.  Relational wealth is defined as the social 
ties derived from social position, trust, reputation, kinship and symbolic systems which 
individuals can draw upon (Bliege Bird & Smith, 2005; Borgerhoff Mulder & Beheim, 2011).  
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In small scale societies this is often operationalized in terms of network membership or 
position or status within social group hierarchies (Shenk et al., 2016; von Rueden, 2014). 
However, the importance of certain types of relationships change over the course of market-
integration and economic development.  Relational wealth, conceived as something more 
similar to status in small-scale studies, is often operationalized as socioeconomic status in 
analysis of parental reproductive behaviors. However, this coarse grain measures of 
relational wealth overlaps conceptually with embodied capital, such as occupation or 
education status, or with material wealth (R. L. Hopcroft, 2006; Stulp & Barrett, 2016; Stulp, 
Sear, Schaffnit, et al., 2016a). 
To better specify and measure relational wealth in transitioning and industrial 
societies, evolutionary demographers can draw on broader social science literature. Indeed, 
social capital theory has a long history of exploring how relational wealth is cultivated, 
maintained, and spent in industrial and developing contexts, particularly in ways that shape 
parental investment decisions (Bühler & Philipov, 2005). A large body of work over the last 
30 years has documented how social capital embedded in communities and personal 
networks shapes education and economic outcomes for both individuals and households 
(Coleman, 1988; Narayan, Pritchett, & Adserà, 1999; M Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).  
Studies have consistently shown the importance of household, school, and community-level 
measures of social capital in educational outcomes(Dika & Singh, 2002; Dufur, Parcel, & 
McKune, 2013; Parcel & Dufur, 2001) as well as opportunities for realizing economic 
returns to early life investments in embodied capital (Friedman & Krackhardt, 1997; S. Lin & 
Huang, 2005).  Households with more diverse ties may have more accurate information 
about employment opportunities, expected income returns for different levels of education, 
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or the better assessments of the economic value of women’s contribution to the households 
beyond the domestic sphere (N. Lin, 1999, 2017).  Parental social network size and 
composition had positive impacts on parental involvement in education at school and at 
home (Sheldon, 2002).  Additionally, parental tocks of social capital can alter the trade-offs 
between continued investments in education and age of entry in the labor market 
(Verhaeghe et al., 2015).   A number of studies have also focused on the context specific 
effects of social networks on household outcomes, assessing how urbanization and access to 
educational services interact with  household level predictors such as household 
composition, household wealth, and  parent’s employment status to determine educational 
outcomes (Matthews, Pendakur, & Young, 2009) (Huisman & Smits, 2009).   
We propose that households that that have access to social connections necessary 
for leveraging education into better employment opportunities, will invest more heavily in 
their children’s education.  This study tests the hypothesis that these types of social resources 
will have a positive effect on school enrollment. We expect that households with social 
network ties that provide opportunities or access to employment will be more willing to 
forgo the immediate economic contributions of child labor with the expectation that long-
term payouts to education investments are more certain. In addition to the positive effects of 
social resources on school enrollment, thus we expect that the effects of social resources will 
be stronger for disadvantaged households.  Social network ties that provide access to 
employment opportunities may carry greater importance for households who face 
discrimination on the job market where formal mechanisms create barriers to access.   
The Current Study 
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To test these hypotheses, we use a nationally representative data from Guatemala.  
Guatemala is an ethnically diverse population with nearly 50% of the population being 
indigenous Maya, while the other 50% is Ladino, or Spanish-speaking people with mixed 
indigenous and Spanish descent.  The high proportion of indigenous combined with extreme 
social, political and economic inequality has resulted in the characterization of Guatemala as 
“the most segregated country in Latin America”(Metz, 2001). This divide is a result of the 
colonial history of exploitation of indigenous populations, the elitist character of Latin 
America and the slow integration of marginalized populations into the market economy 
(Ferreira, 2008).  For Mayans in Guatemala in particular, the result is pervasive structural 
barriers that limit integration, engagement, and social mobility in a skill-intensive labor 
market.  
The experiences of discrimination Mayans face in the labor market are well 
documented in the anthropological and economics literature (Metz, 2001; Patrinos, 2000; 
Thorp, Caumartin, & Gray-Molina, 2006). Discrimination in the labor market means that 
Mayans are be less able to negotiate for higher wages than their ladino counterparts, resulting 
in lower overall levels of income for the same levels of education.  The large wage-
differentials found among a nationally representative sample of indigenous and non-
indigenous workers found that ethnic discrimination could explain as much as one third of 
the wage differentials observed between Mayan and Ladino males (Vásquez, 2010).  
Furthermore, the wage-differentials were found to be the result of lower returns for 
education for Mayans than Ladinos. With lower long-term benefits of completing higher 
levels of schooling, many Mayan parents face greater incentives to reap the immediate 
economic gains of children’s labor contributions.  Indeed, Mayan adults of all ages are more 
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likely to have worked as children, compared to their ladino counterparts, and recent cohorts 
of Mayan children are more likely to combine work and schooling or exclusively work than 
Ladino children (Patrinos & Shafiq, 2008).  
Because of this discrimination and barriers to employment, we expect that Mayan 
households with the social resources that facilitate access to employment opportunities be 
more willing to invest in costly education than those Mayan household without key social 
ties.  While we expect these forms of social connections to increase schooling investments 
for both Indigenous and Ladino households, we expect that social resources will a stronger 
effect on education investments for indigenous households than for non-indigenous 
households.  First, Mayan households may rely more on informal access to opportunities as 
formal mechanisms for accessing employment provide a disadvantage. Social ties can be 
used by the poor to overcome exclusionary rules or practices (Michael Woolcock, Woolcock, 
& Mill, 2001).  Second, indigenous households are disproportionately poor and rural, and the 
effects of social capital on well-being outcomes are typically larger for poorest households.  
Analysis of multiple forms of social capital in Burkina Faso found that the effects of social 
capital on economic well-being were strongest among poorer households, and households 
without land (Grootaert, 2002).  Research in Bolivia also found that as an asset, social capital 
had a greater effect on household welfare among poorer households (Grootaert & Narayan, 
2004).  Finally, households with more crosscutting ties that link to more diverse social 
groups are more likely to be exposed to norms that challenge traditional norms of Mayan 
households. One argument in the literature for low education achievement for Mayan girls is 
because of stricter  traditional gender norms (Hallman, Peracca, Catino, & Ruiz, 2007; Wehr 
& Tum, 2013).  Early marriage and pregnancy, as well as son preference and domestic 
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division of labor within the household can work to prevent girl’s education (Hunt 2008).  
There is pressure to marry early and bear children, resulting in nearly 40% of Maya girls 
entering a consensual or formal union before 18, nearly double that of their ladino 
counterparts (Hallman et al., 2007).  As a result, a young girl’s contribution to household-
well-being is often primarily in the domestic sphere, resulting in low education achievement, 
as poor Maya households are less likely to educate girls as they will leave the household, and 
not gain formal employment that requires education. 
Measuring Social Connections 
To assess the associations between measures of household access to opportunities 
and schooling outcomes, and the moderating effects of ethnicity, we use household stocks of 
social capital as a proxy for access to opportunities.  We employed two common approaches 
to measuring social capital.  The first uses membership in formal and informal institutions as 
a measure of social capital.  Participation in voluntary organizations is a clear indicator of 
social capital, as it facilitated trust, mutual expectations and norms, and increases strength 
and density of network ties(Putnam, 1995).  Group membership promotes strong affective 
ties connecting group members to each other, and is often centered on reinforcing exclusive 
identifies and promoting a homogenous in-group in ways that cultivate and preserve access 
to shared resources (Agnitsch, Flora, & Ryan, 2006; N. Lin, 1999; Putnam, 1995).  These ties 
are important for risk-management and economic support, work to smooth household 
consumption, and serve as informal credit and insurance systems (Saracostti, 2007; M 
Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).   
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In addition to promoting group solidarity and cohesion, voluntary membership in 
civic organizations also provides context for the formation of more heterogeneous social 
ties.  Social capital theorists have argued that a primary benefit of social capital is found in 
diversity of ties that connect dissimilar groups(Burt, 1997, 2001, 2004). The social 
relationships that tend to be outward-looking and heterogeneous, connecting people across 
social groups  provide access to a wider variety of resources and information that can be 
leveraged by households (Agnitsch et al., 2006).  Diversity in social ties is an important asset 
in market economies, with several writers pointing to the importance of ties outside of a 
primary network, including accessing private agencies and public services as an avenue for 
accessing resources and power (Narayan & Pritchett, 1999).  Indeed, Granovetter argued 
that social and economic mobility involved the cultivation of ties beyond the immediate 
network to more expansive and loosely knit networks with greater access to information and 
resources (Granovetter, 1973, 1983).  
The second approach measures informal connectedness through participation in 
collective activities.  Unlike membership in organizations, community activities often do not 
require structured organizations or the potentially costly process of creating new 
organizations.  Furthermore, they often do not entail a permanent commitment or 
investments of time or money.  These activities may necessitate one-time efforts or 
coordination between small groups of people and can be less costly that participating in 
formal or informal organizations. However, participation in collective action outside of 
formal group membership also provides opportunities for developing weak but goal directed 
ties.  These can also connect individuals to locally salient forms of social or political power, 
effectively creating ties that bridge power differences (M Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).  For 
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example, in Guatemala public displays of political loyalty can carry material benefits, 
particularly during election years.  Participating in campaign rallies and activities can have 
lucrative effects on household’s well-being.  Constituents have cited local politicians 
emphasizing infrastructure projects that directly benefit loyal supporters, like road and water 
maintenance, house repairs, and accessing employment opportunities in the municipality.  
Data and Methods 
The data for this study come from the Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida 
(ENCOVI) for the year 2000, which is the Guatemalan version of the World Bank Living 
Standards and Measurement Survey (LSMS).  The ENCOVI is a nationally representative 
survey, with a total of 7,276 households and 37,926 individuals participating.  The 
households were sampled in eight broad regions, cut across both urban and rural areas, and 
includes 25 different ethnic and language groups. The survey collected detailed information 
about household assets, as well as household income and expenditure data.  Furthermore, 
the Guatemalan ENCOVI was the first of the World Bank’s LSMS to include questions 
relating to social capital, including questions about household participation in organizations 
and collective actions.  
Parental Investment in Education. 
School Enrollment. For all members of the household the ENCOVI collected 
enrollment status. The majority of Guatemalans finish their schooling by the age of 24; 
however, by age 16 young people begin leaving familial homes and becoming heads of 
household.  We limit our analysis to those 18 years of age or younger and exclude those 
children who are considered heads of household. The analytic sample contains N=11,680 
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children, age 7 to 18 who were not identified as the head of household.  In Guatemala, 
compulsory enrollment begins at age 7.  For children age, 7 through 18 we treat enrollment 
as a binary variable where 1 indicates that they were enrolled in some form of schooling for 
the survey year (2000).   
Measures of Social Opportunities 
Social capital. We measured social capital in terms of membership in formal and 
informal institutions, as well as participation or involvement in certain forms of collective 
action. The ENCOVI contained a series of questions regarding participation in a number of 
different types of organizations as well as household participation in collective action.  For 
measures based on group membership, individuals older than seven years old identified three 
main institutions in which they participated as members. The types of groups listed 
contained a number of organization types including religious groups, income-generating 
groups, community groups, school-oriented groups, groups dedicated to the provisioning of 
public goods, recreation groups, and social groups (Table 2). 
In the full sample, 21.9% of individuals and 46.6% of households having 
membership in any organization (SM Table 1).  The most prominent form of group 
membership was participation in religious organizations with 16.1% of all individuals and 
32.3% of households participating in a religious group.  Excluding religious organizations, 
6.3% of individuals and 23.3% of households were members of an organization. Given the 
prominence of religious organizations in membership rates, we created two dichotomous 
variables for group membership at the household level.  The first indicated whether any 
household member participated in a religious organization.  The second indicated whether at 
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least one member of the household has at least one tie to at least one non-religious 
organization. We chose to analyze religious and non-religious groups separately as 
membership rates in religious organizations are comparable to all other organizations 
combined.   
For non-religious group membership, we also excluded membership in groups 
directly relating to school (school committees, parent teacher associations), or directed at 
children (boy scouts, girl scouts, youth groups), as these are direct indicators of parental 
investment in offspring and are conflated with our primary outcome variable.  Furthermore, 
school enrollment may increase the likelihood that households participate in organizations 
like these. Table 1. shows the frequencies of membership in all groups in the subset sample 
containing only those households with school-aged children 
For the second measure based on collective action, the ENCOVI asked whether any 
member of the household had participated in several kinds of collective action during the 
previous 12 months.  Activities included collection of funds, community workshops, labor 
agreements, donations in cash or kind, community childcare, and the construction of 
community infrastructure, contacting government officials, information campaigns, and 
electoral campaigns, contacting local politicians, notifying judicial authorities.  We chose not 
to include voting as an indication of participation in collective action.  While it is not 
mandatory in Guatemala, during the civil war, citizens who did not vote were regarded as 
guerilla sympathizers and could face retaliations.  Given the survey data were collected just 4 
years after the peace accords were signed, a number of respondents in sampled communities 







  N % N % p-Value 
Urban 3211 46.8 1402 29.1 p<0.000 
Female 3299 48 2409 50 p=.04 
      
No Parent 643 9% 390 8%  
Mother Only 1240 18% 670 14%  
Father Only 145 2% 112 2%  
Both Parents 4838 71% 3642 76% p<0.000 
      
At least one parent employed 5704 83% 4080 85% p=.02 
Child Employed for Wages 1718 25% 1761 37% p<0.000 
      
Household Membership (Religious) 2385 35% 1861 39% p<0.000 
Household Membership (Non-
Religious) 3495 51% 2536 53% p=0.06 
Households Collective Action  4516 66% 3251 68% p=0.05 
      
Less than Primary  2976 43% 2728 57%  
At Least Primary 2616 38% 1800 37%  
At Least Secondary 1274 19% 286 6% p<0.000 
      
Read or write in Spanish 5431 79% 2845 59% p<0.000 
      
Does not speak Spanish 653 10% 1293 27%  
Secondary Language 87 1% 2876 60%  
Native Language 6126 89% 645 13% p<0.000 
      
 Mean SD Mean SD  
Child Age 12.23 3.48 12.09 3.43 p=.024 
Number of Children in Household 4.15 2.02 4.97 2.11 p<0.000 
      
Absolute Household Wealth 8.8 1.3 7.8 0.9 p<0.000 
Agricultural Wealth 0 1 0.4 0.9 p<0.000 
Log Income 8.2 1.1 7.5 1.1 p<0.000 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all variables split by ethnicity.  For categorical 
variables, Chi-square test to determine if the differences were significant.   For continuous 
variables, we used independent samples t-tests.  
 
In the full sample, 63% of households engaged in some form of collective action. 
The most common forms were the construction of community infrastructure (34.4%), 
donations (39.7%), and labor exchange agreements (20.7%) (SM Table 2).  The number and 
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percentage of households with school-aged children participating in specific collective action 
activities is presented in Table 3.   We created a single binary variable indicating whether the 
household had engaged in any form of collective action in the past 12 months.  
Ethnicity. was self-identified in the survey and included in our analysis as a dummy 
variable indicating whether the head of the household was self-identified as either Ladino=0 
or Indigenous=1.  While most indigenous groups come from the one of the 23 different 
Mayan groups, a small percentage from the sample are also non-Mayan indigenous Xinca 
and Garifuna (0.4%). Like the Mayan groups, Xinca and Garifuna experience discrimination 
(Mulongoy, 2012). 
Covariates 
Household economic capacity.  As households become richer they can better 
cover the direct costs of formal schooling and are less likely to rely on child labor 
contributions.  This suggests a generally positive association between material wealth and 
schooling outcomes.  Two distinct forms of economic resources were assessed – Material 
Wealth and Income.  To assess material wealth, an asset based approached was employed.  
Asset based approaches are often preferred by social scientists working in low- and middle-
income settings as a better means to assess the long-run economic capacity of households 
(Filmer & Pritchett, 2001; Kaiser, Hruschka, & Hadley, 2017) .  We use multiple 
correspondence analysis to estimate two reliable dimensions of wealth (Cronbach’s alpha; 
Dimension1= 0.95 and Dimension2=0.86).  The first dimension corresponds to typical 
asset-based dimension reduction measures, and is dominated by ownership of consumer 
goods, services and construction materials that indicate success in the market-economy.  We 
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transform this first wealth dimension ranking into an estimate of absolute household wealth 
(2011 constant international dollars PPP). The second dimension is associated with success 
in the agricultural sector and has been shown to be associated with a number of health 
outcomes (Hruschka, Hadley, & Hackman, 2017).  Currently, we are ambivalent about how 
material wealth associated with success in the agricultural domain would affect parental 
investments in education.  Larger land-holdings and agricultural wealth may signal the need 
for increased labor contributions of children. This would increase the opportunity costs for 
offspring education.  However, greater success in the agricultural domain may buffer 
households from economic shocks that would prompt parents to pull children from school 
in order to make economic contributions to the household (Carletto, Kirk, Winters, & 
Davis, 2010).   
Finally, we also use total per capital household income.  The ENCOVI collects 
detailed information on income from all household members including formal wage-labor, 
income, agricultural production, and informal employment.  This aggregate household 
income was log-transformed. 
Urban residence. Urban residence has been shown to be an important predictor of 
schooling in developing contexts, and in Latin America in particular (Andersen, 2001).  
Urban parents may be more likely to incur the short-term costs of reduced offspring labor 
contributions in anticipation of long-term gains of increasing educational investments. 
Additionally, parents who invest in education may be more likely to migrate to urban centers 
in order to take advantage of more employment opportunities.  Households were dummy 
coded based upon rural or urban residence.  Rural residence was coded as 0 and urban 
residence was coded as 1.  
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Parents education and language fluency.  In the current study, parental embodied 
capital was measured in a number of ways.  First, in order to capture parental education 
across households with different compositions, we coded education into two dummy 
variables.  The first indicates whether the child has a parent in the household who achieved 
at least completed primary level of education. The second was a similar dichotomous 
variable indicating if the child had at least one parent in the household who had achieved 
some form of secondary education.    
Second, we code Spanish language fluency of parents in the household.   Languages 
are important forms of embodied capital.  Again, to control for differences in household 
composition we use a two dichotomous variable approach.  First, we code if the child has at 
least one parent who speaks Spanish as a second language.  Then, we code if the child has at 
least one parent who speaks Spanish as a native language.  Furthermore, we also use parent’s 
literacy status, and whether the child has at least one parent who can read or write in 
Spanish. 
Additionally, we examine how the effects of parental education vary across ethnic 
lines. Nationally, Mayan households have significantly lower mean levels of education than 
their Ladino counterparts do. Guatemalans are still recovering from a 36-year civil war, 
which left few resources for important social services including health care and education.  
The civil war has documented effects on embodied capital accumulation (in the form of 
education), particularly among the indigenous population as the war had a disproportionate 
impact on the indigenous population, at the height escalating to genocide (Chamarbagwala 
and Morán 2011).  Given the lower levels of education in Mayan households, we expect 
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parental education to have a smaller effect on enrollment for indigenous households than for 
Ladinos.  
Household composition.  We use two measures of household composition.  The 
first is a 4-category factor variable that indicates whether the child’s mother, father, or both 
are present in the household.  0=no parents, 1= Father only, 2= mother only, 3= both 
parents present in the household.  Parents present in the household have been shown to 
shape parental investment outcomes, particularly schooling (Shenk & Scelza, 2012).  Our 
second measure is an ordinal measure of total number of children in the household. While a 
number of studies have identified birth-order effects on parental investments (Borgerhoff 
Mulder, 1998a; Gibson & Lawson, 2011; Hertwig, Davis, & Sulloway, 2002), the ENCOVI 
data do not permit identifying birth order of a given child. We adopt a similar, but more 
general resource-dilution argument whereby a given share of the finite resources of a 
household shrink as household size increases. Thus, we expect that education investment for 
a given child will decrease as the number of school-aged children increase in the household.   
Employment status. We include employment status as a binary variable indicating 
if at least one parent is employed for wages.  As child labor presents a primary opportunity 
cost to household decisions to invest in education, we include a binary variable indicating if 
the child is employed or engaged in work. A child is considered employed if, in the last week, 
the child worked for wages, as self-employed, to have performed paid work for other people, 
to have helped in a family business, or if they declared to have a job but were absent for 
leave, illness, vacation, maternity leave or some other reason (D.Vuri, 2008). 
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Gender. Despite an overall increase in education levels, there still exist prominent 
gender and ethnic gaps in education achievement (Figure 1).  While persistent, global gender 
gaps in schooling have been declining (Grant & Behrman, 2010) and most of Latin America 
has shown improvements in the gender gap in schooling over the last four decades. 
Guatemala is one of a handful of countries that have not closed the gap, with girls having 
significantly lower levels of educational attainment (Andersen, 2001; Duryea, Galiani, Nopo, 
& Piras, 2007).    Employment and income benefits are higher for sons, and families have 
more opportunity to realize these benefits for sons as daughters tend to marry out into other 
families.  Thus, the opportunity costs of losing girls’ labor contributions to the households 
are greater given the lower chances of families receiving the long-term benefits of increased 
education. To account for gender differences in the effects of opportunities, we stratify the 
analyses by gender.    
Child Age.  We include age as a categorical variable to account for nonlinear effects 
on enrollment.  From the ages of 7 to 12 there is a slight positive effect on the probability of 
enrollment.  After age 12 there is a steep decline in the effects of age on enrollment (Figure 
2).  
Analysis 
We first present the differences in economic capacity and household characteristics 
using bivariate descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis, split by ethnicity and 
gender.  We then construct a logistic model with the outcomes of school enrollment for 
both boys and girls that includes all the main predictors and covariates.  We expect a 
significant effect of ethnicity to remain after controlling for differences in household 
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economic capacity, child and parent characteristics, and opportunities.  Second, we expect 
that measures of social capital based on group membership and participation in collective 
action to be positively associated with school enrollments and that the interaction with 
ethnicity and social capital will be positive and significant.  Finally, we include an ethnicity by 
parental education interaction to assess whether parental education has a stronger impact on 
enrollment for ladino households than for Mayan. 
Results 
Distribution of child and household characteristics by ethnicity. Tables 1 
shows the distribution of child and household characteristics by ethnicity. Consistent with 
national demographic patterns, Indigenous households were more likely to be rural, had 
slightly younger children, and slightly higher number of school aged children in the 
household.  Furthermore, Indigenous children are more likely to have dual parent 
households compared to Ladino children and were more likely to have at least one parent 
involved in wage-labor.   
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Figure 1.  Average years of completed schooling for adults by 5-year age 
groupings. 
Distributions of economic capacity and opportunities by ethnicity. Ladino 
households have significantly higher levels of household wealth and household income 
compared to indigenous households. However, indigenous households have higher rankings 
in agricultural wealth dimensions. Results also show significant differences in reported social 
capital across ethnic lines, with indigenous household more likely having bonding and 
linking ties.  Bridging social capital was similar across both indigenous and ladino 
households.   
 Ladino Indigenous  
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 N % N % 
p-
value 
Income Group 287 4% 176 4% 0.17 
Farmer Coops 64 1% 50 1% 0.63 
 Business Associations 28 0% 28 1% 0.23 
Cooperatives 77 1% 69 1% 0.16 
Credit Groups 34 1% 12 0% 0.05 
Professional Associations 64 1% 5 0% 0.00 
Workers Unions 41 1% 17 0% 0.09 
      
Community Group 107 2% 79 2% 0.78 
Civic Group 6 0% 7 0% 0.52 
NGO 76 1% 64 1% 0.32 
Charity Organizations 25 0% 8 0% 0.07 
      
School Group 261 4% 223 5% 0.03 
Family Groups 57 1% 34 1% 0.52 
School Committees 214 3% 189 4% 0.02 
      
Public Goods Group 99 1% 154 3% 0.00 
Political Groups 22 0% 14 0% 0.91 
Boards of Water and Garbage  69 1% 111 2% 0.00 
Board of Roads 8 0% 31 1% 0.00 
Housing Committee 9 0% 7 0% 1.00 
      
Recreation Group 990 14% 359 8% 0.00 
Sports Groups 955 14% 359 8% 0.00 
Boy Scouts 45 1% 4 0% 0.00 
Girl Scouts 2 0% 0 0% 0.64 
      
Social Group 688 10% 716 15% 0.00 
Women's groups 81 1% 165 3% 0.00 
Youth Groups 89 1% 57 1% 0.65 
Cultural Groups 121 2% 51 1% 0.00 
Indigenous Groups 168 2% 177 4% 0.00 
Neighborhood Committees 270 4% 355 7% 0.00 
Table 2.  Distribution of household-level membership rates.   
Finally, indigenous households had significantly lower levels of parental embodied 
capital within the household.  Among Ladinos, 43% of households had parents who had not 
completed primary school, compared to 57% among indigenous households. Furthermore, 
19% of ladino households had one parent who had at least some secondary education, 
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compared to 6% of indigenous households. Unsurprisingly, indigenous household had lower 
levels of Spanish literacy, and fewer children had at least one parent who was a native 
Spanish speaker.   
Multivariate Logistic Regressions School Enrollment. Table 4 presents the 
results from the multivariate logistic regression.  As expected, school enrollments for both 
males and females were significantly higher in urban households compared to rural 
households, and increased with all measures of household economic capacity.  Parental 
education, literacy, and employment status also had strong positive effects on probability of 
enrollment. Age showed the expected curvilinear effect on enrollment, increasing 
probabilities of enrollment from the age of 7 until age 10, and showing a marked decline by 
age 12 (SM Table 2).  In addition, as expected, enrollment probabilities decreased with 
household size.   
  Ladino Indigenous  
N Percent N Percent 
Collection of funds 1221 18% 677 14% 
Community Workshops 168 2% 186 4% 
Contact government officials to access programs 609 9% 634 13% 
Information campaigns 494 7% 469 10% 
Electoral campaigns 758 11% 484 10% 
Contacting local politicians 427 6% 248 5% 
Notifying judicial authorities when problems 
arise 656 10% 324 7% 
Giving monetary or in-kind donations 2278 33% 1084 23% 
Providing unpaid labor to charity institutions 1213 18% 955 20% 
Labor exchange agreements 1370 20% 1401 29% 
Community childcare 188 3% 129 3% 
Construction of community infrastructure 2252 33% 2561 53% 
Voting in elections1 5423 79% 3800 79% 
Other collective action 76 1% 44 1% 
     









Table 3.  Number of Households Engaged in Collective Action in the Past 12 
Months. Voting in elections was not included in the social capital measure based on 
collective action.   
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Figure 2.  Proportion of children and adolescents currently enrolled in school. 


















     






















































































































































































     
Indigenous: 
Membership Tie 











Indigenous : At 
least some primary 




Indigenous : At 
least some 
secondary 














Observations 5,972 5,972 5,706 5,706 






5,116.38 5,108.30 5,203.23 5,192.42 
Table 4. Logistic Regression Models. †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Finally, in the baseline model ethnic identity showed gender differences in the effects 
on enrollments.  After controlling for all covariates, indigenous boys were no less likely to be 
enrolled in school than Ladino children were (OR= 1.05, 95% CI= 0.81, 1.37).  However, 
indigenous girls were significantly less likely to be enrolled in school compared to their 
Ladina counterparts (OR= 0.69, 95% CI= 0.54, 0.87). 
 










No Social Capital 0.71† 
(0.50, 










Ties Only 1.05 
(0.76, 





1.99)   0.91 
(0.63, 
1.33) 
Table 5. Odds Ratios of Enrollment for Indigenous Children Compared to 
Ladino Children. Compared to Ladino children in households with the same levels of 
social capital.  †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
In the baseline model assuming similar effects across ethnicity, all three measures of 
social capital showed positive associations on enrollment.  Compared to households with no 
social capital, households with secular membership ties were 1.44 (95% CI=1.21, 1.71) times 
more likely have a boy enrolled and 1.26 (95% CI=1.06, 1.49) times more likely to have a girl 
enrolled.  Religious group membership had a similar effect for boys (OR= 1.31, 95% CI= 
1.13, 1.52), and for girls (OR= 1.30, 95% CI= 1.13, 1.50).  Finally, households who engage 
in collective activities had children who were more likely to be enrolled than household who 
have not been involved in collective action activities (Boys: OR= 1.23, 95% CI= 1.06, 1.43; 
Girls: OR= 1.37, 95% CI= 1.18, 1.58). 
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Effects of Engagement in Collective Activities. The main test of our hypothesis 
concerns the interaction between ethnicity and the three measures of social capital.  The 
effects of collective activities showed a significant interaction with ethnicity for both boys 
and girls, with the effect of household collective activities strongest in indigenous 
households (Indigenous: Collective Activities Boys p=0.009, Girls p=0.008).  For Ladinos, 
households engaging in collective activities are no more likely to have children enrolled than 
Ladino houses that have no collective activities (Boys: OR= 1.03, 95% CI= 0.84, 1.25; Girls: 
OR= 1.14, 95% CI= 0.93, 1.39).  By contrast, among Indigenous households, those with 
collective activities were  1.52 (95% CI =1.22, 1.91) times more likely to be enrolled in 
school while girls are 1.68 (95% CI= 1.35, 2.09) times more likely (compared to those 
Indigenous households not engaged in collective activities).   
Effects of Secular Group Membership.  Secular group membership had gender 
specific interactions with ethnicity.  For boys, Ladino households engaged in secular group 
membership were 1.27 (95% CI=1.01, 1.60) times more likely to have children enrolled 
compared to Ladino households not engaged in secular group membership.  Similarly, 
Indigenous households engaged in secular group membership were 1.61 (95% CI= 1.24, 
2.09) times more likely to have children enrolled compared to Indigenous households with 
no secular group membership ties.  While the effects are larger for indigenous households, 
the differences in effects of secular group membership did not differ significantly across 
ethnic lines (Indigenous: Membership Tie p=0.18).   
For girls, the effects of secular group membership was only significant among 
indigenous households (Indigenous: Membership Tie p=0.04).  Ladino households who 
engaged in secular group membership were no more likely to have a child enrolled than 
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those ladino households with no secular group membership ties (OR=1.06, 95% CI=0.84, 
1.34).  However, for indigenous households, those with secular group membership ties were 
1.51 (95% CI=1.17, 1.94) times more likely.  
Effects of Religious Group Membership. There were no significant interactions 
of religious membership with ethnicity, for boys (Indigenous: Religious Membership Tie 
p=0.54) or for girls (p=0.27), indicating that religious membership has similar effects on 
enrollment among regardless of ethnicity.  Thus, the interaction term was excluded from the 
full model.  For Ladinos, households with religious group membership ties were more likely 
to have children enrolled in school than ladino households without religious group 
membership ties (Boys OR=1.30, 95% CI= 1.12, 1.51; Girls OR= 1.29, 95% CI=1.12, 1.49).  
Similarly, Indigenous households with religious group membership ties were also more likely 
to have children enrolled than indigenous households without religious group membership 
ties (Boys OR=1.30, 95% CI=1.12, 1.51; Girls OR= 1.29, 95% CI=1.12, 1.49). 
Cumulative Effects of Social Capital. Table 5 reports the odds ratios of 
enrollment for indigenous children, compared to Ladinos, by sex for different levels of social 
capital.  Among households with no membership ties or collective activities, indigenous 
males were less likely to be enrolled compared similar ladino households (OR=0.71, 95% 
CI= 0.50, 1.01), though this was only marginally significant. However, the gap shrunk among 
households with just group membership ties. (OR= 0.90, 95% CI= 0.56, 1.43), with just a 
collective activity (OR= 1.05, 95% CI= 0.76, 1.45), and among households with both (OR= 
1.33, 95% CI= 0.89, 1.99).   
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Among girls, households with no social capital showed indigenous girls were 
significantly less likely to be enrolled in school compared to similar Ladina girls (OR= 0.44, 
95% CI= 0.31, 0.60). The odds ratios of households with one type of membership or 
collective activity showed the indigenous girls were still significantly less likely to be enrolled, 
however the ethnic gap was much smaller (Membership (OR= 0.62, 95% CI=0.40, 0.96), 
households with linking only ties (OR= 0.64, 95% CI= 0.48, 0.87).  However, among 
households with both bridging and linking ties, there were no significant differences in 
enrollment rates for indigenous and Ladina girls (OR= 0.91, 95% CI= 0.63, 1.33).  
 
Figure 3.  Predicted probability of enrollment by household social capital.  
Predicted probabilities are estimated using the mean and modal values for all model 
parameters.     
While indigenous households have lower probabilities for enrollment than Ladino 
households, particularly for households with girls, indigenous households can compensate 
 66 
for the disparity through social capital effects. Figure 3 plots the predicted probability of 
enrollment for children in households as a function of social capital, highlighting the strong 
effects of secular group membership and collective activities social ties on indigenous 
enrollment probabilities. The probability of enrollment for Ladino households differs little 
across households with or without bridging and linking ties.  However, for indigenous 
households, those with both bridging and linking ties have much higher rates of enrollment 
than those households without.   
Finally, we also assessed interaction of parental education and ethnicity on 
enrollment.  For girls, the effect of having at least one parent complete primary school is 
associated with higher enrollment for indigenous girls only.  Both indigenous and ladino 
households showed strong positive effects of having a parent with some secondary. 
However, for boys, having at least one parent with some secondary has a much stronger 
effect for indigenous boys.   
Discussion 
The current study found evidence that indigenous households invest less in offspring 
education, particularly for girls, independent of residential ecology, household economic 
capacity, household composition and parental education level.  These results are consistent 
with the expectation that discrimination in the job-market lowers the opportunity costs of 
child labor by decreasing the long-term payouts to education.  Importantly, we found strong 
effects of specific types of relational wealth on school enrollments, particularly for 
indigenous households.  For indigenous households, the effects of household social ties that 
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link households to more heterogeneous social groups, as well as those ties that help access 
local power structures increase parental investments in education. 
The types of social investments households make are associated with decisions 
regarding investments in the education of their offspring.  The idea that social networks 
change over the course of economic development and have impacts on how household 
navigate reproductive behaviors is nothing new.  In the initial articulation of classic 
Demographic Transition Theory, Notestein noted that important functional roles of the 
family will be replaced by formal institutions, as residential mobility associated with 
industrialization and urbanization reduces strong ties among kin.  Anthropologists have 
assessed how support networks alter the direct costs of childcare and the reproductive-
related norms individuals are exposed to (Bereczkei, 1998; Newson et al., 2005; Sear, Moya, 
& Mathew, 2013).  The current study offers evidence that certain types of social-connections 
may also increase offspring investments through a different mechanism.  We propose that 
social connections provide critical access to economic and social opportunities that can 
increase the long-term payouts to investments in offspring education.  
These findings are consistent with an extensive body of research on social capital 
effects on education and social mobility in industrial populations (Huang, van den Brink, & 
Groot, 2009; Matthews et al., 2009; Portes, 1998).  For anthropologists who study the fitness 
effects of wealth (Borgerhoff Mulder & Beheim, 2011; Colleran et al., 2015), and the 
emergence and maintenance of wealth inequalities over the course of market-integration 
(Mattison, Smith, Shenk, & Cochrane, 2016), the social capital literature can provide insight 
into what types of relationships provide access to opportunities in a given context, as well as 
how households cultivate and maintain new forms of relational wealth.   
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Two other points emerged from the analysis that warrant discussion.  First, contrary 
to our expectations, the effects of parental education were stronger for indigenous 
households than for ladinos.  The embodied capital theory predicts that the effects of 
parental education would be less for marginalized ethnic groups with lower mean levels of 
education (Kaplan, 1996).  This argument is based on the assumption that parental education 
increase the efficiency of investments in offspring education. However, parental education 
also serves as a proxy for increased access to social and economic opportunities.  In this way, 
parental education may increase the payouts to investments in offspring education more 
strongly among indigenous households by providing a means of accessing opportunities for 
upward social or economic mobility. 
Second, the largely positive association of agricultural wealth on both enrollment and 
progression suggests that increasing agricultural holdings does not create larger opportunity 
costs that with increasing child labor demands.  These results suggest that, in the 
Guatemalan context, success in the agricultural dimension can be used to enhance education 
in offspring.  It is likely that households rich in agricultural wealth are less likely to 
experience economic shocks that require children to trade-off long-term benefits of 
education, with immediate benefits of economic contributions they can make through 
employment.  
Limitations 
A number of limitations are worth noting.  First, we used cross-sectional 
observational data with self-reported school enrollment.  The nature of observational data 
does not permit establishing clear causal pathways.  Rather than social resources shaping 
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parental decisions to invest in offspring, households with children enrolled in schools may 
be more likely to seek out groups to participate in or engage in collective action. Second, the 
current study employed relatively coarse-grained measures of social capital at an aggregate 
level.  We propose that membership and participation in collective activities promotes the 
formation of heterogeneous social ties that households can leverage to access opportunities 
that can increase the value of investments in offspring education.  However, these groups 
may also strengthen within group bonds and facilitate social insurance norms.  These types 
of bonds can increase a household’s ability to continue to address the opportunity costs 
associated with sending children to school.  More direct measures of the diversity of 
household ties and the nature and strength of supportive relationships could better 
distinguish the causal mechanisms underlying the association between household social 
networks and parental investment decisions.  
Third, it may be the case that communities differ in their distribution and quality of 
voluntary organizations and opportunities for membership are limited. Additionally, local 
avenues for participation in collective actions can differ dramatically across communities.  
How the strength and access to formal and informal associations as well as opportunities for 
more fluid forms of collective participation will shape how households navigate trade-offs 
involved with investment in these forms of social resources, as well as their potential 
downstream effects on human capital investments.  
Similarly, the outcome measures of school enrollment are based on measures of self-
report. that the presence of household ties to a wide variety of types of formal and informal 
civic organizations may signal community effects on education. Communities with these 
opportunities available may have other infrastructure in place that may make it easier for 
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households to invest in education. Here we assume that schools available to indigenous and 
non-indigenous are roughly equivalent and the lower wage returns for indigenous are due to 
market discrimination.  This motivates lower levels of investment as the opportunity costs 
for long-term investment decrease.  However, if there are stark differences in the quality of 
education available to Ladinos and indigenous households, the wage-returns may not reflect 
discrimination.  While there is some evidence that differences in school attributes can 
account for some of the achievement gap between indigenous and non-indigenous 
households (McEwan & Trowbridge, 2007), the results are not conclusive.  For example, 
other research has shown little effects of school quality using an extensive list of school 
attributes (Marshall, 2009). However, these researchers found evidence that community-
effects relating to institutions and labor-markets provide a more compelling explanation for 
the achievement gaps between indigenous and non-indigenous households.  
Conclusion 
Evolutionary and economic models of parental investment often cite education as 
the primary determinant of success in wage-labor economies.  However, accessing 
opportunities for skill-intensive employment may vary according to factors unrelated to 
education investments.  Here we found evidence that discrimination on the job-market may 
lower parental investments in education, and that households who face economic 
discrimination may invest more in education when they have the social connections to 
realize economic returns to investments in education.  These results highlight a relatively 
unexplored pathway by which social connections shape parental investment decisions, 
particularly in the contexts of market economies characterized by inequality in employment 
opportunities.   In market economies where education is important for economic and social 
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mobility, households face opportunities to cultivate new types of social connections.  Rather 
than offsetting the direct costs of childcare or providing channels for the spread of high-
investment norms, the right types of social connections can modify the expected returns to 




ECONOMIC CAPACITY OR MARKET OPPORTUNITIES? DISENTAGLING 
WEALTH EFFECTS ON COMPLETED FERTILITY IN 56 LOW-AND MIDDLE-
INCOME COUNTRIES 
Abstract 
Numerous studies have shown mixed associations of wealth with fertility, a finding 
that has posed ongoing puzzles for evolutionary theories of human reproduction.  One 
potential reason for these mixed results is that measures of wealth do not simply assess 
economic resources, which are expected to increase fertility.  Certain forms of wealth can 
also serve as a proxy for market opportunities available to a household, which some theories 
propose should reduce fertility.   In this way, the multi-faceted meaning of many wealth 
measures obscures our ability to draw inferences about the causal mechanisms underlying 
the relationship between wealth and fertility.  We propose a means of disentangling 
economic capacity and market opportunities by estimating the effects of alternative measures 
of wealth (e.g. agricultural wealth) that do not carry the same market-oriented biases as 
standard asset-based measures. Using multi-level models, we assess the effects of measures 
of agricultural and wage-labor market-based forms of wealth on completed fertility in 
472,812 households, across 90,425 sampling clusters, across 114 surveys in 56 countries. 
Consistent with expectations, market-based wealth and education showed consistent 
negative associations with completed fertility.  By contrast, agricultural wealth was usually 
associated with increased fertility.   Using these multiple measures of wealth, we also employ 
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a multi-group latent variable structural equation model to estimate 1) latent variables 
capturing economic capacity and market opportunity and 2) their effects on completed 
family size.  Market opportunities had a consistent negative effect on fertility, while 
economic capacity had a weaker but generally positive effect on fertility.  The results show 
that the confusion between measures of wealth and the concepts of economic capacity can 
impede our understanding of how material resources shape reproductive decision making.   
Introduction: 
The associations between socioeconomic status and fertility are a biological 
puzzle.  The global transition to low fertility in the midst of modernization has been a 
biological puzzle for decades (Handwerker, 1986; Kaplan, 1996; Vining, 1986).  A central 
feature of this puzzle is the inconsistent relationship between socioeconomic status and 
fertility across human contexts.  A long history of studies in anthropology have often 
documented positive effects of wealth and status on reproduction and fertility across a range 
of traditional and subsistence populations (Cronk, 1991; Flinn, 1986; Turke & Betzig, 1985).  
For example, when wealth is measured as food energy, researchers have often found a strong 
positive association between wealth and reproductive success (Borgerhoff Mulder & Beheim, 
2011; Kaplan, Lancaster, Tucker, & Anderson, 2002).  When wealth comes in the form of 
material assets in these contexts, there is also a positive association with reproductive output, 
particularly for men (Borgerhoff Mulder & Beheim, 2011; Cronk, 1991; Flinn, 1986; Nettle 
& Pollet, 2008). However, positive effects of wealth and status on fertility are far from 
universal, and numerous studies have also shown negative or null associations, especially 
among market-integrated populations (Retherford, 1986; Vining, 1986).  Over the course of 
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the fertility transition, wealthier families reduce their fertility earlier and more dramatically 
than the rest of the population (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998b; Cummins, 2013; Livi-Bacci, 
1986; Skirbekk, 2008).  Furthermore, within contemporary western populations, wealthier, 
higher status men tend to have lower fertility (Kaplan et al., 2002; Lam, 1986; Pérusse, 1993). 
In low and middle income countries where populations are at different stages of this 
transition, there is a negative association between household wealth and women’s fertility 
(Hruschka & Burger, 2016). At the population level, there seems to be a clear negative 
relationship between population wealth and fertility rates, where people in wealthier 
populations tend to have lower fertility (Hruschka, Sear, Hackman, & Drake, 2018; Lutz & 
KC, 2011; Myrskylä, Kohler, & Billari, 2009; Pérusse, 1993).  Finally, studies using historical 
samples have identified a switch in the relationship between socioeconomic status and 
fertility, whereby high status individuals move to low fertility strategies while low-status 
individuals move to having relatively higher fertility (Skirbekk, 2008).     
The current paper tackles the puzzling and inconsistent associations between 
socioeconomic status and fertility by exploring the possibility that measures of 
socioeconomic status (e.g. wealth & education) confound two factors—differential 
economic capacity and differential market opportunities—that should have opposing effects 
on fertility.  We first review recent studies and theoretical explanations of the wealth-fertility 
association. We focus on investment models, common in economics and evolutionary social 
sciences, which argue market economies drive down fertility as parents focus on generating 
access to novel forms of social and economic opportunities (Shenk, 2009).  Next, we argue 
that commonly used measures of wealth tend to conflate economic capacity with market 
opportunities, making it difficult to test theories about the independent effects of economic 
 75 
 
capacity and market opportunities.  Finally, we attempt to disentangle the effects of market 
opportunities and economic capacity on fertility using multiple forms of wealth to parse out 
the effects of economic capacity from those of market opportunities.   
Prominent models suggest market economies change quality-quantity trade-
offs, resulting in null or negative relationships between socioeconomic status and 
fertility.  The demographic transition and associated changes in the wealth and fertility 
relationship has been discussed in great detail in evolutionary social sciences (Borgerhoff 
Mulder, 1998c; Irons, 1983; Sear et al., 2016; Vining, 1986).  The causes of the fertility 
decline and changing relationships between socioeconomic status and fertility have been 
attributed to increasing costs and benefits of status competition (Boone & Kessler, 1999; 
Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998b; S. E. Hill & Reeve, 2005; Low et al., 2002), the increasing costs 
and benefits of parental investments in novel market economies (G. Becker et al., 1990; 
Kaplan, 1996) women’s education (Low et al., 2002; Robinson, 1997), changing payoffs to 
human capital investments (Kaplan et al., 2000) the breakdown of kinship networks (Turke, 
1989), and cultural evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Richerson & Boyd, 2005) or the 
costs and benefits of fertility reduction as a social mobility strategy in a stratified society 
social stratification (Rogers, 1990).   
Perhaps the most prominent evolutionary and economic explanations have been 
those that focus on how market economies shape the quality-quantity trade-off that parents 
face.   These models focus on quality-quantity trade-offs derived from life history 
frameworks where parents balance investment in producing offspring with investment in the 
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quality of existing offspring to promote survival and future success (D. Lawson, Alvergne, & 
Gibson, 2012; D. W. Lawson & Mulder, 2016b).   
 
Figure 1.  Theoretical model of the quality quantity trade-off. 
Figure 1 outlines the key points of the quality-quantity models.  Resources that are 
devoted to reproduction (A) are split between the total number of offspring (B) and the 
investment in each offspring (C) in order to maximize their own reproductive success (G).  
Kaplan and colleagues developed an extensive theory of human reproduction that specified 
many of the links in the full model (Kaplan, 1996; Kaplan et al., 2002; Snopkowski & 
Kaplan, 2014). By combining economic and evolutionary theory, they outlined a theory of 
reproduction and the physiological and psychological mechanisms that underpinned 
reproductive behavior. According to their model, among hunter-gatherers, fertility is 
coordinated through systems of behavioral and physiological responses, with psychological 
adaptations which evolved to track the links between parental investment and the 
reproductive success of their offspring.  The skill-dependent foraging niche of humans 
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required extended parental support, which placed constraints on the fitness returns to both 
parental investments in existing offspring, and the production of additional offspring.   
A key premise in many of these models is that navigating trade-offs in order to 
maximize reproductive success (G) is a complex task.  Thus, parents try to optimize some 
combination of proximate currencies like total offspring (B) and offspring socioeconomic 
success (E).  To do this, they pay attention to how efficiently their investments in child 
quality (C) translate to child quality (E) and how efficiently child quality translates into 
socioeconomic success (E).  For example, what is the cost of ensuring a child reaches a 
certain level of education?  And how much can a child leverage a given level of education to 
achieve a certain income or status?  While the efficiency of moving from (C) to (E) can be 
quite variable, the costs of bearing and feeding a child are roughly fixed by the physiological 
costs of reproduction, lactation and post-weaning feeding.    
According to this model, increasing socioeconomic payoffs to investment in child 
quality can tip the balance of quality-quantity trade-offs, leading parents to reduce fertility in 
favor of investing in fewer high-quality children. The model here outlines two ways that 
returns on investment can be increased.   
The first is increasing the efficiency with which investments (C) translate into child 
quality (D)(e.g. investments in education leading to a more educated and skilled child).  The 
second is how well a person can use their education and skills to unlock opportunities for 
increase income or socioeconomic success.  Kaplan’s model touches on both of these.  First, 
it proposes that parents with experience in the education system are better equipped to help 
their children navigate the educational system.  Thus, their investments in education can 
 78 
 
more efficiently lead to an educated child  (Kaplan, 1996; Kaplan et al., 2002). This can result 
in a positive association between parents embodied capital (H) and the optimal parental 
investments (C), to produce higher quality offspring (D).  When parental wealth is associated 
with parental education, this can also lead to negative associations between measures of 
wealth and overall fertility.     
Second, Kaplan’s model also considers how changing market opportunities can 
increase the socioeconomic returns to education (e.g. the efficiency by which D translates to 
E).  For example, they argue that competitive wage-labor economies increase opportunities 
to translate current quality into future SES.  They also argue that changing balances of 
supply and demand for skilled labor can affect returns on investment in child quality (Kaplan 
& Lancaster, 2000).  While broad social changes can shape overall quality-quantity tradeoffs, 
not all children in a society will have the same opportunities to translate education (or other 
investments in quality) into greater later life success.  Changing economic conditions may 
affect women differentially because of lower expected socioeconomic gains from education 
and differences in available employment opportunities (Snopkowski & Kaplan, 2014). A 
family’s social connections may provide more opportunities for translating a child’s 
education into income-producing jobs (Hackman in prep(Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973; 
Matthews et al., 2009; Portes, 1998).  The wage returns to schooling may be lower for certain 
ethnic groups that suffer from exclusion from certain sectors of the labor market (Patrinos, 
2000; Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 1997).  Even physical proximity to market opportunities 
may shape returns to investment  (McAllister, Gurven, Kaplan, & Stieglitz, 2012).  Market 
opportunities are often more concentrated in urban centers, providing more opportunities to 
translate education into income-producing employment (Mattison & Neill, 2013; Neill, 
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2010). Additionally, a family’s experience with labor markets and market economies may 
provide valuable skills and connections necessary to translate education into future income 
and socioeconomic status.  Even in the presence of educational opportunities, family 
livelihoods may shape the expected returns to investments in child quality.  For example, 
Hedges and colleagues found parental investments in schooling to vary across distinct 
livelihoods in Tanzania, with market integrated household facing lower opportunity costs 
and greater perceived returns to investments in education (Hedges et al., 2016).  In contrast, 
pastoralist households were least likely to send offspring to school, given the increased 
ability of children to contribute economically to the household and the lower perceived need 
and payout for cultivating school-based skills.  
In each of these cases, individual and household variation in market opportunities—or 
opportunities to translate education into future socioeconomic status—may substantially 
shape the returns on investment in child quality and quality-quantity tradeoffs more 
generally.  Analysis of populations without accounting for this variation in accessing market 
opportunities may further obscure how parents are decisions about the trade-offs (Stulp, 
Sear, & Barrett, 2016).   
In heterogeneous populations, where different groups of people face different suites 
of employment opportunities, investment options, or different costs of raising children, 
groups with greater market opportunities might follow decision rules that lead to smaller 
families overall compared to groups with less market opportunities (Mace, 1998; Stulp & 
Barrett, 2016). In those cases where family status (however measured) is associated with 
greater market opportunities for their children, this can lead to a negative correlation 
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between family status and fertility at the population level.  However, within those high and 
low status groups we may see those with greater economic capacity still having higher 
relative fertility  (Mace, 1998) (An example of Simpson’s paradox).   In an early  empirical 
example, one study among highly educated women in Britain’s top universities found wealth 
was positively associated with reproductive success (Hubback, 1957).  Here, similarities in 
education were assumed to reflect similarities in market opportunities.  In another example,  
across subgroups in urban and rural Mongolia, researchers found a negative association 
between resources and fertility, however within each group fertility correlated positively with 
measures of material resources (Alvergne & Lummaa, 2014). More recently, Colleran found 
that within communities in rural Poland, associations of non-farming and farming wealth 
with fertility were generally positive after controlling for market integration and education 
(Colleran et al., 2015). 
Assessing empirical support for the model is difficult due to data and 
measurement issues. Researchers have argued that data limitations have inhibited clear 
tests of the model, particularly in comparative contexts (Colleran et al., 2015; R. L. Hopcroft, 
2006; Stulp, Sear, Schaffnit, Mills, & Barrett, 2016b).  A key component of this critique is 
disentangling key concepts, such as economic capacity and market opportunity, from 
standard measures of parental socioeconomic status.  Disentangling economic capacity and 
market opportunities is important because they are argued to have distinct, interactive, or 
even opposing effects on fertility (Colleran et al., 2015; Shenk et al., 2016).  However, 
historical and cross-sectional datasets often use measures that conflate market opportunities 
with economic capacity.    
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Different measures of parental socioeconomic status may differentially confound 
parental economic status and market opportunities available to their children.  For example, 
parental education may more strongly reflect market opportunities than economic capacity.  
Consistent with this expectation, parental education is robustly associated with investing 
more in each of fewer children (Skirbekk, 2008).   
Even something as apparently simple as parental wealth may reflect both parental 
economic capacity and market opportunities available to their children. For example, asset-
based wealth measures commonly used in large demographic datasets most commonly 
reflect the kinds of assets that can be accumulated with cash and engagement in market 
economies (e.g. TVs, cell phones, concrete walls, tin roofs) (Bingenheimer, 2007; Hruschka 
et al., 2017)(Rutstein & Johnson, 2004).  As such, these measures reflect the outcome of a 
history of engagement in specific types of economic production, and exposure to distinct 
suites of opportunities to accumulate different sorts of material assets and manage 
reproduction.  For this reason, these measures of material wealth not only reflect the 
economic capacity of a household, but also the extent to which households are exposed to, 
and can capitalize on, market opportunities.  
Many measures of wealth conflate these two concepts because they reflect 
both accumulation of resources and engagement with specific economies.  Here we 
propose an additional means of disentangling economic capacity and market opportunities 
by estimating alternative measures of wealth that do not carry the same biases as standard 
asset-based measures. In contrast to a one-dimensional model of material wealth, a 
multidimensional model of wealth suggests that different asset-based indicators of wealth 
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reflect not only the economic capacity of a household, but also a proxy for engagement in 
different types of economic production. Engagement in these distinct dimensions may create 
suites of opportunities and constraints for households that are not captured in one-
dimensional approaches to estimating material wealth. These opportunities and constraints 
are particularly important for understanding the nature of the reversals between wealth and 
fertility.  For example, success in the agricultural economy requires that parents make very 
different decisions regarding investments in human capital compared to households engaged 
in the livelihoods grounded in the cash economy.  The returns to investments in education 
and to reduced fertility may vary widely when households are predominantly engaged in 
professional wage-labor versus households engaged in predominantly agricultural production 
(Hedges et al., 2016). 
To address this concern, recent studies have focused on agricultural measures of 
material wealth and the effects on fertility, particularly in mixed economies where traditional 
livelihoods exist alongside market opportunities (Colleran et al., 2015; Garenne, 2015).  In 
previous work, Colleran has pointed to the need to include multiple forms of wealth, 
particularly traditional and market-based, as a means of disentangling economic capacity and 
engagement in the market economy.  Indeed, in here study of farming communities in rural 
Poland she includes measures of both farming and non-farming wealth, based on ownership 
of different suites of assets.  Furthermore, she used independent indicators of market 
integration using employment status and occupation categories.    The ability to capture 
more direct measures of “traditional” and “modern” wealth is a strength of using primary 
data in small-scale or regional studies.  However, these studies tell us little about the effects 
across a broader range of global contexts.  To better understand the process of demographic 
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change in the contexts of market integration, the changes in the importance of different 
types of material wealth, and the suites of opportunities that accompany economic 
development, we need comparative data.  Colleran states the problem clearly:   
Many studies focus on either pre-DT or post-DT populations, where measures 
of wealth and status- and the cultural and economic contexts in which they matter-
differ dramatically.  This heterogeneity makes it difficult to compare the magnitude 
and variation of effects across study sites, or to identify points on a continuum of 
change.  More detailed comparative studies are needed in transitioning populations 
where both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ forms of wealth and status influence fertility. 
(Heidi Colleran, Jasienska, Nenko, Galbarczyk, & Mace, 2015, pg.35) 
Disentangling agricultural and market-based wealth in worldwide sample. We 
address this need for more detailed cross-population studies of diverse wealth effects on 
fertility by assessing effects of measures of “agricultural” and “market-based” forms of 
wealth on fertility in 472,812 households, across 90,425 sampling clusters, across 114 surveys 
in 56.  Data come from the Demographic and Health Surveys, which collects detailed 
information on household assets, construction, and access to services, alongside 
demographic data.  The DHS surveys are conducted in low and middle income countries 
and countries that receive US foreign aid, with a number of countries containing multiple 
waves. In the last two decades, the DHS have also begun collecting data on livestock 
ownership and land-ownership, which have been used to estimate indices of traditional or 
agricultural wealth (Garenne, 2015; Hruschka et al., 2017).    
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Researchers have applied data reduction techniques to use these data to generate 
multiple orthogonal dimensions of material wealth (Hruschka et al., 2017).  Using an MCA 
approach, researchers are able to identify multiple dimensions of wealth that reflect 
engagement in the market economy and agricultural economy. The MCA approach has deep 
commonalities with the data reduction techniques used to estimate typical wealth indices 
from asset data.   Households are represented in a multidimensional livelihood space, where 
distances between data points are determined by shared ownership in suites of assets and 
access to services.  The MCA then successively identifies the dimensions that capture the 
most variation in the cloud of households.  These dimensions represent composite measures 
of material wealth along different dimensions, with distinct suites of assets and services 
carrying different weight along each dimension. Households are then assigned values along 
each dimension of wealth, permitting researchers to identify individual households and mean 
household position in the multi-dimensional livelihood space based on similarities in asset 
ownership.  
We use this technique on a large database of demographic and health monitoring 
surveys from low- and middle-income countries worldwide to assess the effects of multiple 
forms of material wealth on total fertility.   We use these multiple measures of wealth to 
assess the links between economic capacity and market opportunities with completed 
fertility.  First, we assess the associations between agricultural and market wealth on fertility 
and the extent to which these effects vary across populations.  We expect market-based 
wealth to be generally negatively associated with fertility, as it also reflects a family’s access to 
market opportunities as much as their economic capacity. By contrast, we expect agricultural 
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wealth to be positively associated with total fertility as it is a more direct measure of 
economic capacity with little reflection of market-based opportunities.  
Second, we assess the overall effect of economic capacity and market opportunities 
on fertility by exploring the association between the market wealth and agricultural wealth 
across populations.   Using both measures of wealth in a latent variable structural equation 
model, we estimate how agricultural and market based wealth reflect economic capacity, and 
how education and market wealth reflect market opportunities. The modelling approach 
permits 1) estimating economic capacity and market opportunities as independent latent 
variables and 2) their overall effect on fertility outcomes across a broad range of populations 
currently undergoing transitions to low fertility. 
 






Starting from a database of 307 harmonized DHS datasets ranging from 1989 to 
2016 we estimate multiple dimensions of wealth independently for each survey.  These 
dimensions reflect engagement and success in the market-based economy and the 
agricultural sectors. We limit the analysis to those countries that we can reliably estimate 
market and agricultural dimensions of wealth, 2) had data on completed fertility for women 
aged 40-50.  We split the analysis between urban and rural samples, given the nature and 
meaning of wealth may vary across contexts with different suites of social and economic 
opportunities for pursuing different livelihoods.   
This resulted in 114 surveys across 56 countries.  Sample sizes varied across the 114 
surveys, ranging from the low of n=322 for Malawi 2012 to the high of n=49,295 for India 
2015. Figure 3 maps the countries used in the analysis, where reliable measures of both 
wealth dimensions were estimated.
 
Figure 3.  Countries included in the analyses. Color codes indicate mean completed 
family size of women 45-49. 
 87 
 
 As described below, we then center all variables at the community level in order to 
capture local dynamics and focus on how wealth is associated with increased or decreased 
fertility relative to the community mean.  Such an approach captures anthropologist’s 
sentiments about the primacy of local-level resource and status competition (Colleran, 
Jasienska, Nenko, Galbarczyk, & Mace, 2014a; Colleran & Snopkowski, 2018). Using 
community centered measures of material wealth and fertility we use mixed effects models 
to assess the effects of market-based wealth, agricultural based wealth, and education on 
relative fertility.  The mixed effects models permit estimating unique slopes for each of the 
surveys in the dataset, and estimating the variation in the effects across all countries.   
Next, we assess the relationship between the effects of multiple forms of material 
wealth on fertility. To do this we employ a multi-group structural equation model (see Figure 
2).  This allows us to estimate the economic capacity and market opportunities as 
independent latent variables and assess their effects on fertility across the populations in the 
sample.   Again, we expect market opportunities to negatively impact fertility, while 
economic capacity is predated to be positively associated with fertility.  
Methods and Measures 
Relative Wealth Indices. We follow the procedure outlined in Hruschka et al 2017, 
where household-level wealth dimensions were computed for each country individually.  
Variables used to estimate the dimensions included source of drinking water, electricity, wall, 
roof and floor construction material, sanitation, cooking fuels and material asset ownership 
like bikes, radios, televisions, and cellular phones.  Household holdings of cattle, cows, 
sheep, chickens, horses, goats, and country-specific animals were also included. Finally, 
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household land holdings were included.  All household assets and services were coded as 
present/absent, while nominal variables, such as flooring and wall construction materials 
were harmonized across all surveys and then dichotomized.  Continues variables, such as 
cattle holdings were binned into categories and then dichotomized.   The total number of 
dichotomized / discretized variables used for each country ranged from 11 to 204. 
(Mean=93, SD=56) 
The multiple correspondence analysis was applied separately to each survey, using a 
household by variable matrix.  The MCA procedure produced 4 orthogonal dimensions of 
wealth, however we only retained 2 wealth dimensions that had acceptable internal reliability 
and clear interpretations of reflecting either the market-economy or the agricultural sector.  
Reliability was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha of <0.7.  We conduct a sensitivity analysis in 
the supplemental materials using both a stricter reliability threshold (alpha >0.79), and a 
more relaxed threshold (alpha >0.60).   
To identify clear interpretations of the dimensions, we anchored them using a suite 
of anchoring variables (see supplemental materials for detailed description of the anchoring 
procedure.).  For each country, we assign households a score along each dimension, and 
examine the relationships between these scores and household characteristics, ownership of 
specific assets, and access to specific services.  For the market wealth dimension, we 
examined the relationship between dimension scores and ownership of a television, 
refrigerator, electricity, and rural or urban residence.  We also compared the DHS wealth 
index against the market wealth dimension produced from the MCA procedure.  For 
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anchoring the agricultural dimension, we examine the relationship between land and 
livestock ownership, and rural or urban residence. 
The MCA procedure produces a ranking of households along each dimensions for 
the all households included in that survey.  In other words, the indices produce a population-
level relative ranking of households along each dimension.  To assess the local, relative 
effects of both measures of wealth, we center each household’s measures of wealth, fertility 
and education relative to the cluster mean.  The sampling cluster is the lowest level of 
geographic scale in the DHS sampling strategy.  Clusters reflect sampling units within 
subdistricts (akin to states in the US), and usually represent about 20-50 households that are 
in relatively close proximity to each other.  95% of the PSU’s have between 1 and 80 
individuals represented in the dataset, despite the range realistically going as high as 800 
(Supplemental Materials figure of psu size).  
This centering permits estimating a household economic position relative to the 
community mean rather than the country.  This is the level in which we would expect to see 
wealth effects on fertility. It is precisely in these local contexts, where the distributions of 
opportunities and resources shape what economic pathways are feasible.  Furthermore, local 
social contexts provide the suite of behavioral strategies deemed acceptable behavior 
(Bachrach & Morgan, 2013; Colleran, Jasienska, Nenko, Galbarczyk, & Mace, 2014b; 
Johnson-Hanks, Bachrach, Morgan, & Kohler, 2011; Kertzer, 2013).  Centering all measures 
at the cluster level permits estimating the relative effects of wealth and education on fertility 
while holding community-level differences constant.  
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Relative Education.  Similar to wealth, the effects of education on fertility may be 
context specific.  There are several reasons that parental education can be associated with 
lower fertility.  First, parents may delay reproduction in order to continue pursuing higher 
education, and secure higher paying jobs.  Second, parental education can increase the 
returns to their children’s education in several ways as described above.  We use number of 
years of education which ranged from 0 to 15 across all surveys.   As with wealth we center 
on the community-level mean at the level of the sampling cluster.  
Relative Total Fertility.  We used total children ever born for all women age 40-50 
yrs old.  Survey average completed family size ranged from the low of 1.8 in Ukraine 2007 
and 2.3 in Modlova 2005 to the high of 7.6 in Niger 2012 and 7.5 in Chad 2015.  Across all 
surveys the mean total fertility was 5.2 (SD=1.3).  As with the wealth and education 
measures, we center fertility on the community mean total fertility of surveyed women 40-50 
yrs old.  
Analysis 
We first present the descriptive and bivariate statistics for all variables included in the 
models.  We then report the results of the MCA in generating reliable wealth estimates.  We 
give a brief review of the associations with the anchoring variables used to interpret the 
market wealth index and the agricultural wealth index.   
To assess the associations between both measures of wealth on fertility, we fit a 
multi-level linear model with the outcome completed fertility relative to the community 
mean.  The multi-level modelling approach permits explicit modelling of the cross-
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population structure of the data and can assess how the relationship between wealth, 
education, and fertility varies across different populations.  Since variables are centered at the 
community level, we do not include random intercepts, however we permit the slopes for 
the effects of market wealth, agricultural wealth, and education to vary across surveys.   To 
estimate survey-specific effects of market wealth, agricultural wealth, and education, we use 
the conditional modes of the random effects (using restricted maximum likelihood REML), 
which are similar to the Empirical Best Unbiased Linear Predictions (EBLUPs) from linear 
mixed effects models (Bates, 2010; Bates et al., 2017; Zuur, Ieno, Walker, Saveliev, & Smith, 
2009).  Finally, because the meanings and effects of wealth and educations can vary across 
rural and urban contexts in different ways both within and between countries, we chose to 
split the analysis by urban and rural residence.   
The multi-level model provides estimates of the effects of the wealth and education 
measures on fertility.  To test whether market-based wealth measures conflate economic 
capacity and market opportunities, we employ a multi-group latent variable structural 
regression model (Kline, 2015).  In the model, we use market wealth, agricultural wealth, and 
education to estimate two latent factors – economic capacity and market opportunities – 
which are then regressed on relative fertility (See Figure 2).  This model represents a first 
attempt at partialling the effects of market opportunities from economic capacity in standard 
asset-based wealth measures.  Furthermore, it provides a first approximation of the relative 
magnitude of the positive effects of economic capacity on fertility relative to the negative 
effects of market opportunities.    
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The full latent variable structural regression model can be seen as two separate 
models that are estimated simultaneously.  The first model, called the measurement sub-
model, estimates the latent variables from the indicators.  The second part of the model, 
called the structural sub-model, uses the estimated latent variables as predictors in a linear 
regression with fertility as the outcome for each population.   
In the model, the latent variable economic capacity captures the covariance between 
effects of agricultural wealth and market wealth on fertility.  As both measures reflect the 
economic capacity of the household, the shared variance reflects this. The latent variable for 
market opportunities captures the covariance between market wealth and education.  We 
estimate two latent variables with three correlated indicators.  In SEM models, estimating a 
latent variable with only two indicators requires special conditions.  Since we are estimating 
two latent variables with three indicators, a key requirement is the residual variances of the 
indicators cannot be correlated with each other (Kenny, n.d.; Kline, 2015).  Correlated 
residual variance, or errors, reflect the indicators have something in common that is not 
captured by the latent variables.  We assess the correlated residual variance of the indicator 
variables in SM. 
Additionally, to set the scale of the latent variables, the factor loading of one of the 
indicators needs to be fixed.  This sets the scale of the latent variable to the same scale as the 
indicator variable.  This marker-indicator approach to setting the scale of the latent variable 
is commonly used. We use the marker-indicator approach to scaling the latent variables, 
using agricultural wealth as the indicator for economic capacity, and education as the 
indicator for market opportunities. Our model was sensitive to setting the values of the 
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indicator variables, and convergence issues occurred when setting values to 1. Running a 
multi-group sem across 114 different surveys, particularly with a measurement model that 
has relatively few indicators, can often result in convergence issues (Kenny, n.d.).  Most 
prominently are Heywood cases, where estimated variances are negative.   All of the 
Heywood cases were resolved when re-scaling the latent variables by setting the reference 
indicators between 0.4-0.7, rather than the standard 1.  All reference scales are included in 
the SM.  Here we report the standardized estimates for the measurement model, where 
standardization is based on the variance of the latent variables.  We report the completely 
standardized coefficients, where standardization is based on the variance of latent variables 
and observed variables, however this does not allow for computing standard errors (Kenny, 
n.d.; Kline, 2015).    
As with the multi-level model, we estimate the sem by urban and rural samples 
independently.  We first estimate the models on the full sample, without accounting for 
population differences.  We then assess the same models for each population in the sample 
using multi-group specification.  We examine the sign and magnitude of the parameters in 
the structural model for each population, as well as the distribution of these parameters 
across all populations, to assess whether economic capacity and market opportunities are 
associated with relative fertility in the predicted directions.  Assessing the mean and standard 
deviation of the model parameters across allows for a simple description of the between 
country variation in the effects of the estimated latent variables on fertility.   
For each of the SEM models, we assess model fit using a number of standard model 
fit indices.  The standard chi-square test assess discrepancies between the model and the 
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observed data in the covariance structures.  However, this test becomes less reliable with 
large samples, and very small discrepancies can result in failing this model test.  While we 
report this statistic, we focus more on relative, or incremental fit indices, which reflect how 
well the model fits the data relative to a null model.  We use the CLI and the TLI for these, 
which have standard threshold cutoffs of greater than 0.95 as indicating good fit (Kline, 
2015).   We also report the RMSEA which is a widely used measure of model fit that unlike 
the Chi-square the RMSEA is relatively invariant to large increases in sample sizes 
(https://www.rasch.org/rmt/rmt254d.htm). The RMSEA has standard thresholds of less 
than 0.05 for a good fit (Kline, 2015).   
Results 
Multiple dimensions of household wealth. Out of the 307 total available DHS 
surveys, the MCA procedure identified at least two reliable wealth dimensions (Cronbach’s 
alpha >0.70) with clear interpretations for 114 surveys from 56 countries (Figure 1). The first 
dimension of wealth identified for each country reflected success within the market 
economy.  As with Hruschka et al 2017, we compared the first dimension identified by the 
MCA with the original DHS wealth factor score.  This first dimension was strongly 
associated with the DHS wealth index factor score, with correlations ranging from a low of 
0.67 to a high of 1.0 (mean r=0.95, SD=0.045).  Only nine of the 114 had a correlations 
coefficient below a 0.90, and only two were below 0.80.  This dimension clearly captures the 
same variance in household asset ownership and access to services as the original DHS 
wealth index.   
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For the Agricultural wealth measure, we used land and livestock ownership in order 
to anchor the dimension.  The average association between the agricultural wealth measure 
and ownership of livestock ranged from a low of r=0.16 to a high of r=0.84 (mean r=0.47, 
SD=0.14).  The average association between the agricultural wealth measure and ownership 
of land ranged from a low of 0.06 to a high of 0.61 with a mean of r=0.34 (SD=0.13).   
Urban 
  Fertility Market Wealth Agricultural Wealth Education 
Fertility 1.00    
Market Wealth -0.16 1.00   
Agricultural Wealth -0.04 0.39 1.00  
Education -0.23 0.37 0.21 1.00 
     
Rural 
  Fertility Market Wealth Agricultural Wealth Education 
Fertility 1.00    
Market Wealth -0.12 1.00   
Agricultural Wealth 0.03 0.13 1.00  
Education -0.12 0.32 0.12 1.00 
     
Table 1.  Correlations of Model Predictors.  The correlation between all model 
predictors and the outcome variable split by urban and rural samples. 
The agricultural and market-based wealth dimensions were not highly correlated across 
surveys, with the average correlation of (r=0.04).  This was expected given the MCA 
estimates orthogonal dimensions.  However, once anchored the wealth measures were 
centered at the cluster level.  These centered measures showed more variation in their 
association with each other than the raw, un-centered wealth scores.  Table 1 presents the 
correlations for the full dataset.   As expected, market wealth and education have a negative 
association with fertility.  Furthermore, education and market wealth are positively associated 
in both urban and rural settings.  Notably, in urban settings agricultural wealth is positively 
associated with both market wealth and education.  Examining the same set of correlations 
by survey show similar results.   
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Multi-level Model Results 
Effects of Market wealth, agricultural wealth and education on fertility.  
Results of the multilevel models are presented in Table 3 and Figures 3 and 4.  The 
association between market-based wealth and fertility was consistently null or negative.  The 
average model coefficient for market-based wealth effects on completed fertility was b=-0.63 
(-0.72,-0.55) for rural and b=-0.54 (-0.61,-0.47) for urban populations. 
 Urban Rural  
  Coef 95% CI Coef 95% CI 
Fixed Effects     
Intercept 0.00 (-0.01, 0.01) 0.00 (-0.01, 0.01) 
Market Wealth -0.54 (-0.61, -0.47) -0.63 (-0.72, -0.55) 
Agricultural Wealth 0.19 (0.15, 0.24) 0.15 (0.1, 0.19) 
Education -0.69 (-0.75, -0.64) -0.49 (-0.56, -0.41) 
     
N 
  
157,852   
   
267,187   
ngroups 114  114  
     
Variance Components     
Market Wealth 0.11  0.16  
Agricultural Wealth 0.04  0.05  
Education 0.07  0.12  
Residuals 4.11   5.66   





Figure 4. Survey specific slopes for the effects of Market Wealth, 
Agricultural Wealth, and Education across surveys.  Top panel reflects 
urban samples and the bottom is rural. 
These results show that on average a 1 SD increase in market-based wealth above the 
community mean is associated with more than a half child reduction in total children born 
for both rural and urban populations.   We found similar results for the effects of relative 
education on completed fertility.  The model average coefficient was negative for both rural 
(b=-0.49, [-0.56,-0.41]) and urban samples (b=-0.69, [-0.75,-0.64]). Thus, on average, a year 
increase in education relative to the community mean is associated with approximately a half 
child decrease in total offspring. The model average coefficient for agricultural wealth was 
positive in both urban (b=0.15, [0.10, 0.19]), and rural contexts (b=0.19, [0.15, 0.24]).  Thus, 
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a standard deviation increase in agricultural wealth relative to the community mean is 
associated with a small but significant increase in number of offspring. 
Latent Variable Model Results 
Assessing Model Fit.  We first ran the latent variable structural regression model 
on the full sample split by urban and rural residence.  Overall, the two models showed 
acceptable fit using three of the four metrics (Table 3). The chi-square test indicated the 
models did not adequately predict the data, however, this is typical of large-sample studies 
(Kline, 2015).  An examination of the residual correlations, or the difference between the 
observed and model predicted correlations showed the model did not over or under-
estimate the correlations by any significant margin (typically greater than 0.1(Kline, 2015). 
Both models exceeded acceptable thresholds (>0.95) for model fit for the CFI and the TLI, 
as well as the RMSEA (<0.05). For urban samples, the multi-group SEM had acceptable fits 
for the TLI, CFI and the RMSEA.  For rural samples in the multi-group SEM, the model fit 
statistics passed acceptable thresholds for the CFI and the RMSEA.    





  Value Value Value Value 
Chi Square Test 677.9 1292.1 2660.5 3229.5 
CFI 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.95 
TLI 0.98 0.95 0.95 0.93 
RMSEA 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 
     
Groups 1 1 113 113 
Df 4 4 452 452 
N 157,232 264,282 157,232 264,282 
Table 3.  Fit statistics for the SR Models.  
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The Measurement Sub-Model: Estimating the Latent Variables.  The results of 
the SEM models are presented in Table 4 and Figure 5.   The results of the measurement 
sub-model – the part of the model estimating the latent variables from the measures of 
wealth and education – are presented as the fully standardized solution.  This allows for a 
interpreting the coefficients as standardized regression coefficients, and permits comparisons 
within and between models on a similar metric. The measurement sub-model shows both 
agricultural wealth and market-based wealth are association with economic capacity but the 
association with agricultural wealth is twice as strong as market wealth. The association of 
economic capacity with both wealth measures were strongest in urban settings, both in the 
full model and multiple group model.  In rural settings, economic capacity had a strong 
association with agricultural wealth, but a much weaker and more variable association with 
market wealth.  Second, The latent variable market opportunities is positively associated with 
market wealth and education in all models, though the associations between the indicators 
and latent were weaker in the multigroup sample. Across all the models, the estimates of 
economic capacity and market opportunities are positively associated with a correlation 
ranging from r=0.2 in the multigroup rural to a r=0.47 in the urban full model.   Finally, 
education is positively associated with market opportunities.   
The Structural Sub-Model: Latent Variable Regression.  For the structural 
model, the coefficients are presented as the unstandardized coefficients.  In contrast to the 
measurement portion of the model, the unstandardized coefficients have a meaningful 
interpretation.  In the full sample models, a 1 sd increase in economic capacity was 
associated with 0.37 and 0.23 increase in fertility in urban and rural samples. In the multi-
group models, the average coefficients were also positive.  In urban samples the effects were 
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0.4 increase in relative fertility for every 1 sd increase in economic capacity.  Additionally, 
42% of the models found significant positive effects of economic capacity on fertility.   
However in the multi-group rural model, the average effect of economic capacity was much 
lower, only 0.17 increase in fertility for a 1 sd increase in economic capacity.   
 
Figure 5.  The results of the latent variable regression model by urban and 
rural samples.  The effects of economic capacity in urban (A) and rural (C) are 
significantly positive in 42% cases in the urban model and 35% of cases in the rural 
model. The effects of market opportunities in urban (B) and rural (C) samples were 
largely negative with 82% and 75% of cases reporting significant negative 
associations in urban and rural samples.  
While 35% of the samples found a significant positive effect in the multi-group rural 
samples.  The effects of market opportunity on fertility were negative across all models. 
Additionally, the effects of market opportunities were much stronger than those of 
economic capacity. In the full sample models, the effects of market opportunities were close 
to an average reduction of a full child for every standard deviation increase in market 
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opportunities.  In the rural sample the average reduction of a full child was observed for 
every two standard deviation increases in market opportunities.  In the multi-group models, 
the results for urban samples were qualitatively similar to the full sample model.  That is for 
an average increase of 1 sd in market opportunities, women had over a one child reduction 
in fertility, with 82% of the sample having a significant negative effect on fertility.  In the 
rural sample, the average effects of market opportunities on fertility were -0.44, where a 1 
child reduction in fertility is associated with over a 2 sd difference.  However, the small 
effect is somewhat robust as a significant negative effect was found in 75% of the samples.  
Discussion 
The results show that the effect of wealth on fertility depends critically on how 
wealth is measured and interpreted.  Our two wealth measures showed both positive and 
negative associations with fertility across a broad range of populations. Consistent with our 
expectations, market wealth showed negative associations with fertility, while agricultural 
wealth tended to show more positive associations.  Additionally, using these two measures 
we estimated latent variables to disentangle the effects of economic capacity and market 
opportunities from standard asset-based wealth measures.  Again, consistent with our 
expectations market opportunities had a strong negative association with fertility, while 
economic capacity had positive impacts on fertility, though generally much weaker. These 
results suggest a new interpretation for the puzzling associations between wealth and fertility 
found in populations undergoing fertility transitions.  Rather than capturing fertility 
differences between households with different levels of economic resources, these 
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associations are capturing households that vary across the types of livelihoods they are 
engaged in and the market opportunities available to their children. 
Furthermore, when accounting for variation in market opportunities, households 
with greater economic capacity still tend to have relatively higher fertility than households 
with less economic capacity.  This suggests that much of the puzzling associations between 
wealth and fertility may reflect the inability of current approaches to properly disentangle 
market opportunities and economic capacity.  Indeed, the majority of economic and 
evolutionary theories of low fertility point to the influence of modern competitive wage 
labor economies as the primary driver of fertility declines.  However, as market economies 
develop and take hold in a population, households vary in their ability to access and take 
advantage of novel economic opportunities offered by expanding markets.  Households with 
greater opportunities to turn costly investments in education into greater socioeconomic 
success are more likely to engage in a low-fertility, high-investment strategy.   
Clearly there is a need to better capture variation in market opportunities both 
populations undergoing economic development and industrial low fertility populations.   
Studies that use education as a proxy for market opportunities are increasingly finding null or 
positive associations between economic capacity and fertility in both populations undergoing 
fertility transitions (Colleran et al., 2015), and in low-fertility industrial populations  (R. 
Hopcroft, 2017; Stulp, Sear, Schaffnit, et al., 2016a).  However, measuring market 
opportunities outside of populations undergoing market integration have been difficult, 
resulting in the reliance on education, and rural or urban residence for rough 

































Loadings           
Market Wealth 
*Economic 
Capacity 0.39 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.81 -0.03 0.42 0.86 
Agricultural Wealth 
* Economic 
Capacity 0.70 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.55 0.14 1.00 0.98 0.17 1.00            
Market Wealth* 
Market 
Opportunities 0.34 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.74 0.26 0.17 0.88 
Education * Market 
Opportunities 0.57 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.39 0.25 1.00 0.78 0.14 1.00 




Capacity 0.47 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.39 0.25 0.82 0.20 0.18 0.65            
Structural 
Regression Sub-















0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.03 1.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 
Economic 
Capacity 0.37 0.01 0.23 0.00 0.40 0.65 0.42 0.17 0.32 0.35 
Market 
Opportunities -0.95 0.01 
-
0.53 0.00 -1.05 0.84 0.82 -0.44 0.40 0.75            
Groups 1  1  113   113   
N 157,232 264,282 157,232  264,282  
           
Table 4.  Results of the SEM and Multi-group SEM Models. 
The findings from the multi-level model differ in a number of substantial ways from 
a recent cross-population analysis using the same DHS datasets.   Using the same set of 
surveys, Colleran and Snopkowski found more variation in the effects of market-based 
wealth on fertility, with a number of surveys showing positive associations between market 
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wealth measures and fertility (Colleran & Snopkowski, 2018).   However a number of 
reasons could account for the differences.  First, we focused solely on completed fertility, for 
women 40-50 years of age, while Colleran and Snopkowski analyze age-specific fertility.  The 
effects of economic capacity on fertility can vary across different stages of the reproductive 
period, as wealth can speed up or slow down progression through multiple offspring.  
Second, the differences could be a result of how we center at the community level.  We 
focused our attention on how household wealth, relative to the community mean, was 
associated with increased or decreased total fertility relative to the community mean.  
Colleran and Snopkowski included a measure of community level fertility to account for 
within community dynamics but left the wealth indices scaled to population level rankings.  
There are a number of important limitations and caveats to interpreting the 
structural regression models. First, we clearly need more indicators for the latent variables in 
order to fully assess the constructs in the measurement model.  Our ability to estimate the 
latent variables rests on the covariance structures in the indicator variables.  Using only two 
indicator variables for each latent construct resulted in a relatively unstable model. For 
example the SEM model faired worse in rural settings, with relatively poorer scores on 
model fit indices. One reason for this could be the low covariance between the indicator 
variables in rural settings.  Without a significant amount of shared variance it is difficult to 
estimate reliable latent variables. One possibility is that this is the results of poor 
measurement. Another is that these are truly orthogonal, and reflect that in many contexts 
success along one dimension carries steep trade-offs with success along another dimension.  
To assess these two possibilities we need more indicators of market opportunities and 
economic capacity.  Two important candidates to include in future work are occupation 
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types and employment status of individuals and heads-of-households.  Similar to stocks of 
assets, these directly reflect a household’s engagement with wage-labor employment and also 
proxy success in competitive labor economies.  While the DHS surveys do collect data on 
occupation and employment, the types of occupations available and their meaning across 
contexts can vary significantly.   
Despite these limitations, the SR model provides a first attempt at disentangling key 
features of the quality-quantity trade-off model in developing contexts and market 
economies.  Estimating these effects in a multilevel model would be ideal but given the data 
limitations we would not be able to identify the model.  Adding random slopes and 
intercepts to either the measurement model or the latent variable structural model would 
increase the number of parameters estimated beyond the amount feasible given the number 
of observed variables included in the model.  
Conclusion 
Commonly used measures of wealth tend to capture both economic capacities, as 
well as a  history of engagement in specific suites of livelihoods.  For standard asset-based 
wealth measures used in demographic and health surveys, the bias towards market-oriented 
goods and services means the measure tracks not only household economic capacity but also 
serves as a proxy for market opportunities.  When these wealth measures are treated 
uncritically as simply reflecting economic capacity they can limit our ability to draw 
inferences about how economic disparities shape health and reproductive outcomes.   Our 
results highlight the need to estimate multiple, varying forms of wealth and status in order to 
disentangle the effects of market opportunities from economic capacity.   While 
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anthropologists have focused on estimating multiple forms of wealth and status in 
community studies, this is difficult in large secondary datasets often used in evolutionary 
demography.  Our method draws on recent changes to demographic and health monitoring 
surveys where data on livestock, land, and other agricultural assets are used to estimate 
measures of wealth that track success independent of market opportunities. Using multiple 
measures of wealth, we were able to estimate the independent effects of economic capacity 
and market opportunities on relative fertility.  We showed that across a broad range of 
contexts, economic capacity typically has a positive association with fertility.  However, this 
positive association is often masked by a strong, negative association between fertility and a 
household’s engagement in the market economy.  Accounting for household-level variation 
in market opportunities and relying on multiple measures of household economic capacity 
are key steps to refining theories about how households make reproductive and parental 






The combined research illustrates the importance of market opportunities in shaping 
fertility and fertility declines.  In the Guatemalan case, exclusion from social and economic 
opportunities that accompany economic development has resulted in ethnic differences in 
both fertility patterns over the past 30 years as well as differences in parental investments in 
education.  However, the extent to which social and structural barriers to accessing market 
opportunities can be overcome through reliance on social connections seems to have a 
positive impact on Mayan families’ decisions to invest in education, particularly for girls.  In 
the case of the cross-national comparison, controlling for market opportunities provided 
evidence that households with more economic resources are still able and willing to convert 
those extra resources into greater reproductive output across a wide range of contexts.   
Both of the empirical studies add to a growing body of work in evolutionary 
demography that is focused on within-population variation in fertility, particularly those 
undergoing fertility transitions (Sear et al., 2016).  This so-called second wave of evolutionary 
demography is characterized by a greater attention to mechanisms that drive within and 
between population variation in fertility (pg 7).  Both of the empirical studies presented in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 focus explicitly on capturing intra-household variation in access to 
market opportunities as a primary means of explaining within population variation in fertility 
and parental investment decisions.   
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These studies contribute to a deeper evolutionary understanding of low fertility by 
expanding economic frameworks through explicitly disentangling wealth and status.  
Recently, economic models have been painted as necessary yet insufficient in explaining 
transitions to low fertility (Shenk et al., 2016), and are increasingly incorporating both 
cultural evolutionary dynamics and modelling alternative status as an alternative currency to 
fitness and resources (Colleran et al., 2015; Low et al., 2002; Snopkowski & Kaplan, 2014).  
Our explicit focus on market opportunities provides a novel approach to measuring status in 
market economies, as anthropologists have recently begun characterizing status as access to 
resources.  Our results focus on how variation in access to competitive wage labor jobs can 
shape parental investment and fertility decisions both within and across populations.  
Future Directions 1 – Social capital and fertility in an evolutionary framework 
The focus on social relationships in Chapter 2 provides a new perspective to 
economically-oriented models of fertility in evolutionary demography, and a potential 
pathway for resolving debates regarding social and economic drivers of fertility declines.  
Demographic theories of fertility change have focused on changing social relationships as a 
causal determinant of declining fertility in a number of ways.  Indeed, early architects of the 
classic demographic transition theory suggested the role of extended kin ties changed as 
people took advantage of the opportunities provided by economic development, 
urbanization, and industrialization (Davis 1945; Notestein 1945; Notestein 1953). In modern 
low fertility environments, people rely more on resources embedded in formal social 
institutions and success in skill-intensive labor markets rather than social relationships for 
important things (Handwerker 1986). In order to achieve cultural and economic success in 
new modern environments, social networks widen and non-kin interactions become 
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increasingly important (Handwerker 1986; Newson, et al. 2005). Effective and efficient 
formal social institutions allowed for less of a reliance on extended kin ties for important 
resources (Hruschka, et al. 2014). 
An alternative to the quality-quantity trade-off hypothesis is that it is precisely this 
changing composition of networks that lowers fertility by shaping the social transmission of 
reproductive norms (Bühler and Philipov 2005; Colleran, et al. 2014; Colleran and Mace 
2015; Newson, et al. 2007). Social networks are the channels in which ideas spread and 
norms are enforced, and network attributes appear to influence reproduction (Bernardi and 
Klärner 2014), including contraception (Lindstrom and Muñoz‐Franco 2005; Montgomery 
and Casterline 1996). Fewer kin in social networks means less pressure to reproduce or pro-
natal social influence (Newson, et al. 2007). The independent effects of kin influence and 
child-care support has yet to be tested empirically (Mathews and Sear 2008). 
The rising costs of child-rearing and changing social networks offer two explanations 
for modern low fertility, though these might be linked through a common process. Both 
social influence and economic motivations play a role in declining fertility. Recent work has 
begun to draw these approaches together (Colleran, et al. 2014; Shenk 2009; Shenk, et al. 
2016; Shenk, et al. 2013). One notable example is (Snopkowski and Kaplan 2014) where the 
authors predict that with differential gains from education, fertility strategies will cluster in 
social networks which then shape the flow of reproductive norms within the network. 
People rely on stocks of cultural knowledge to understand investment outcomes, and social 
learning is particularly important when environments are rapidly changing and long term 
outcomes are difficult to predict (Henrich and McElreath 2003; Richerson and Boyd 2008). 
Kaplan and Snopkowski’s model is an important step in integrating the effects of social 
 110 
 
influence and economic effects on fertility; however, what is missing is how social networks 
themselves directly shape the differential gains from education and market involvement.  
A large body of work over the last 30 years has emphasized the importance of social capital 
in today’s modern world(Bourdieu 1986; Knack and Keefer 1997; Lin 2002; Torsvik 2000). 
The social resources embedded in personal networks is a determinant of economic 
outcomes for both individuals (Coleman 1988) and households (Narayan and Pritchett 1999; 
Narayan and Pritchett 2000). Despite broad variation in theoretical definitions and empirical 
applications, the concept of social capital has been used extensively to understand the 
material benefits of sociality (Lin 2002; Portes 2000). The resources embedded in social 
networks shapes access and effectiveness of investments in education (Horvat, et al. 2003; 
Lai, et al. 2015), and economic outcomes in competitive wage labor economies (Burt 2000; 
Granovetter 1973; Marsden and Hurlbert 1988).   This literature suggests an alternative 
process by which social relationships can lower fertility. Rather than through declining kin 
influence and child support, social relationships influence fertility by facilitating access to 
education and economic opportunities.  However, the economic effects of these social 
relationships are not limited to kin support for childrearing; they also shape opportunities for 
education, employment, and marriage.   
In a broader sense, there is an opportunity here for evolutionary social sciences to 
expand its theoretical and methodological tool-kit to understand how social relationships 
shape life-history trade-offs over the course of economic development. Anthropologists 
have been increasingly focused on relational wealth in understanding fitness differences, 
however the use of relational wealth in evolutionary demography is limited in two ways.  
First, population studies often rely on coarse-grain measures that can conflate other forms of 
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wealth, like education, income, or socioeconomic status.  Second, relational wealth is itself 
diverse, and the ways in which relational capital can be accrued and utilized changes over the 
course of market integration and industrialization. The social capital literature in sociology 
has a long history of studying the material benefits of social relations (i.e. relational capital) in 
developing and industrial societies. The theoretical and analytic tools taken from social 
capital literature can be employed to address both problems in evolutionary approaches to 
low fertility.  These tools offer means to take steps toward a systematic comparative study of 
the fitness effects of wealth by better understanding the different kinds of relational wealth 
that can be accrued within and between populations and the mechanisms by which they 
impact fitness. 
Future Directions 2 – Estimating impact of market opportunities  
Transitions in economic systems showed that different types of wealth increase 
importance in different economic systems (Colleran et al., 2015).  In hunter-gather societies, 
wealth is food resources and linked directly to fertility through the impact of energetic 
resources on physiology.  In addition, embodied capital, in the form of size, hunting and 
fighting skill, knowledge of local ecology are key determinants to access mates and fertility 
(CITE).  As hunter-gatherers transition to agriculture, new forms of wealth become central 
determinants of reproduction.  Particularly, extra-somatic wealth, typically in the form of 
land, livestock, and other material assets are increasingly associated with higher fertility 
(Borgerhoff Mulder & Beheim, 2011; Irons, 1983; Pérusse, 1993).  However, through market 
integration, where systems of traditional subsistence economies are replaced by competitive 
wage-labor markets, the importance of embodied capital re-emerges in the form of 
education, employable skills, and occupational achievement.   
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In addition to the changes in the importance of different types of wealth, there is a shift in 
the kinds of material wealth that individuals pursue, and their relevance to different pathways 
to prosperity.  For example, the positive associations between material wealth and fertility in 
pre-transition societies are often assessed using locally salient forms of wealth related to 
agricultural or subsistence economies, such as land, livestock, and other related forms of 
assets (Borgerhoff Mulder & Beheim, 2011; Cronk, 1991; Mace, 1998).  However, the 
negative association between wealth and fertility observed in post-transition societies are 
often measured using either indicators of socioeconomic status (R. L. Hopcroft, 2006; Stulp, 
Sear, Schaffnit, et al., 2016a), or a suite of assets that indicate success in the market economy, 
such as consumer goods and services (Colleran & Snopkowski, 2018).  Thus, over the course 
of the transition, and the changing associations between wealth and fertility, there is an 
associated change in the types of asset ownership that reflects different pathways to 
prosperity.  The study presented in Chapter 3 explicitly addresses these by drawing on a 
broad range of assets in estimating multiple dimensions of wealth that reflect economic 
capacity and engagement in different livelihoods.  
Increasingly, studies have focused more on this multifaceted nature of material 
wealth and the effects on fertility, particularly in mixed economies where traditional 
livelihoods exist alongside market opportunities (Colleran et al., 2015; Garenne, 2015).  
However, these studies tell us little about the effects across a broader context.  As such, in 
order to better understand the process of this reversal, the changes in the importance of 
different types of material wealth, and the suites of opportunities that accompany economic 
development, we need comparative data.  However, comparative data is hard to come by.  
Studies of wealth and fertility conducted in small-scale and less market-integrated societies 
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are able to collect wealth measures that capture the diversity of livelihoods and pathways to 
prosperity that are salient in the local socio-ecology.  In contrast, broad national and cross-
population studies often rely on large cross-sectional datasets that may lack the sufficient 
resolution to capture salient aspects of the local contexts and the multi-facetted nature of 
wealth in these contexts.   
Treating market opportunities as a proxy for a certain form of status also permits 
studying the effects of status on fertility across a wide-range of populations undergoing the 
fertility transition.  Consistent with anthropological conceptions of status, market 
opportunities reflect a certain form of access to resources through providing channels for 
turning education into income.  Our ability to assess market opportunities across a wide-
range of populations permits estimating the variable effects on fertility, and how the effects 
of wealth on fertility may vary as a function of market opportunities.  In addition to the 
estimating the general range and interaction effects of wealth and status on fertility, a focus 
on market opportunities will help on-the-ground ethnographers identify how parental 
investments in reproduction might trade-off with investments in their own social status. In a 
given context, what types of investments do parents make that enhance their own market 
opportunities, and how do these investments shape other reproductive trade-offs?  
Understanding these intergenerational effects of parental investments in their own social 
standings should help reconcile low fertility high-investment strategies with an evolutionary 




The work presented in this dissertation directly contributes to a number of the aims of 
the second-wave’ movement of evolutionary demography, and more broadly to expanding 
evolutionary approaches to understanding human fertility.  First, this dissertation adds to a 
prominent evolutionary model of fertility by incorporating social relationships as a means by 
which parental investments in education translate into offspring socioeconomic success.  
Second, the work takes steps toward integrating evolutionary demography with neighboring 
social science disciplines, particularly sociology, through incorporating the social capital 
concept in the embodied capital theory.   Finally, the work here adds methodological 
innovation by providing a novel approach to estimating the impact of market opportunities 
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Experimental Vignette Study 
Despite what appears to be a commonly stated set of norms reflecting low fertility and 
emphasizing the importance of education, the residents of Acatenango also frequently state 
that Mayan households are seen as less likely to be able to achieve these aims.  We collected 
data from a vignette study to examine how people perceive individual and structural barriers 
to finishing education, having appropriate numbers of children, and the need to rely on child 
labor to overcome economic hardships.  Data were collected from 110 households.  We 
gave the following hypothetical description of a family, varying key characteristics.  We were 
interested in whether participants saw individual characteristics like couple age and ethnicity 
would affect estimates of ideal and appropriate numbers of children, as well as the likelihood 
of investing in education, particularly in the face of economic hardships.   
The sample size was too small to assess the full factorial design and interactions of all 
factors but we were able to assess the main effects of each of the factors.   Controlling for 
participant, participant ethnicity, and vignette group and other factors, results showed that 
there are perceptions that Mayans are more likely to have larger family sizes and less likely to 




In this hypothetical scenario, respondents perceived Mayan families as less likely to use 
family planning.  Focusing on education and employment, Mayan families were perceived 
less likely to finish primary or secondary school relative to Ladinos, less likely to find a good 
job in urban settings.  Finally, Mayan households were perceived as more likely to pull 
children from school to help contribute to the household during times of economic 
hardships.   Figure S1 plots the odds ratios for the ethnicity factor for each of the response 
questions.  The logistic regressions control for all the other factors, as well as participant 
ethnicity.   
 
Figure S1. Odds ratios of agreement with the statements.   
There is a couple who are [18-20/early 30s].  They are [mayan / ladino].  They live in a nearby [aldea / town]  and 
have [many / few] children.  The couple works [in the fields / in town]. 
Based on you observation of other couples in the same or similar situation: 
1. What do you think [many / few] children means for this couple?_________ 
2. How many children do you think would be best for this couple? __________ 
3. How likely is it that this couple will [want?] have another child? 
4. How likely is it that this couple uses contraception to no longer have children? 
5. How likely is it that all of the couple’s children finish primary school? 
a. Secondary school? 
b. Get a good job in town or in the city? 
6. If the couple is struggling to provide basic food goods for their family, or suffers from money problems, 













A key finding of this preliminary work was that Mayans saw themselves as less likely 
than Ladinos to be able to achieve these aims.  These sentiments of Mayans perceiving less 
opportunities reflect sentiments about Mayan households perceived social standing in the 
community and in the country as a whole. In 2012, data from the community ladder 
question showed Ladinos are more likely to rate their social standing in both the community 





Figure S2. Mean Completed Fertility for Selected Latin American Countries. The 
















  N %   N % 
Religious Group 6097 16.1%  2350 32.3% 
Income Group 306 0.8%  259 3.6% 
School Group 231 0.6%  210 2.9% 
Public Goods Group 135 0.4%  117 1.6% 
Recreation Group 983 2.6%  733 10.1% 
Community Group 116 0.3%  99 1.4% 
School Group 795 2.1%  669 9.2% 
      
Any group 8045 21.2%  3393 46.6% 
Any group excluding 
religious groups 2373 6.3%   1692 23.3% 
  
Table 1S.  Frequency of voluntary associations.  
 
  
    
Households 
(7,276) 
    N % 
Collection of funds  1,077  14.8% 
Community Workshops  204  2.8% 
Contacting government officials to access social programs  649  8.9% 
Information campaigns  530  7.3% 
Electoral campaigns  671  9.2% 
Contacting local politicians  370  5.1% 
Notifying judicial authorities when problems arise  607  8.3% 
Giving monetary or in-kind donations  2,160  29.7% 
Providing unpaid labor to charity institutions  1,265  17.4% 
Labor exchange agreements  1,507  20.7% 
Community childcare  189  2.6% 
Construction of community infrastructure  2,504  34.4% 
Voting in elections  5,419  74.5% 
Other collective action  79  1.1%     
Any Collective Action  6,277  86.3% 
Any Collective Action excluding Voting   4,583  63.0% 
Table 2S.  Frequency of households engaging in collective action activities 
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Observations 5,972 5,972 5,706 5,706 
Log Likelihood -2,527.46 -2,518.53 -2,572.64 -2,563.11 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,116.93 5,107.07 5,207.28 5,196.22 
Note: *p**p***p<0.01 









Anchoring the wealth dimensions. 
The results of the MCA produce dimensions along which households are ranked.  
Household are assigned values along each of the estimated dimensions, creating a position in 
multidimensional space.  Importantly, positive values on these dimensions do not have 
inherent meaning, where increasing values do not mean increasing wealth.  To assign a 
direction to these dimensions, and a clear interpretation, we assessed the correlation between 
the estimated dimensions and key anchoring variables. Based on these associations with 
anchoring variables, we assign a direction to the dimension where increasing values represent 
increasing wealth.  
Anchoring the market wealth dimension 
1) Assessed the direction, significance, and consistency of correlations between 
dimension scores and ownership of assets linked to market success. We also included 
correlations with the DHS wealth index that was calculated by DHS using similar 





e. Wealth Index from DHS 
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2) If the associations between dimension scores and the four indicators were all in the 
same direction we labeled the dimension as consistent.  We also tracked the number 
of indicators that returned a significant correlation with the dimension.   
3) If the dimension was not consistent, i.e. one of the associations of the indicator 
variable with the dimension was in the opposite direction as the others, we used the 
association with the DHS wealth index to anchor and interpret the dimension.  
Anchoring the agricultural dimension 
Anchoring the agricultural dimension proceeded in a similar fashion however, we first 
needed to identify whether dimension 2 or dimension 3 from the MCA was most consistent 
with proxies for success in the agricultural sector.  As described in Hruschka et al, the MCA 
was permitted to estimate up to 4 dimensions.  Most surveys were only able to identify 3.  In 
the small number of surveys used in the Hruschka et al paper, dimension 3 was interpreted 
as capturing regional or livelihood variation in the agricultural sector.  However, in the full 
dataset, a small number of cases, showed that a reliable third dimension captured general 
success in the agricultural sector better than the second estimated dimension.  The 
procedure for determining which dimension reflected agricultural wealth and anchoring the 
dimension was as follows:  
1) Assess correlations between dimension 2 and dimensions 3 with anchoring variables 
a. Own livestock 
b. Own Land 
2) Assess their consistency, i.e. are they both in the same direction. 
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3) We default dimension 2 as agricultural dimension if dimension 3 was inconsistent 
(meaning opposing directions for the correlations 
4) If dim 2 is not consistent and dim 3 is we default the agricultural dimension to the 
dimension 3.  
5) If neither is consistent, or if both are consistent, then we assign the agricultural 
dimension based on the absolute magnitude of the associations with the anchoring 
variables.   
